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Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using
Criminals as Witnesses
by
Ti HO ORABLE STEPHEN S. TROTr*
A prosecutor who does not appreciate the perils of using re-
warded criminals as witnesses risks compromising the truth-seeking
mission of our criminal justice system.... Because the government
decides whether and when to use such witnesses, and what, if any-
thing, to give them for their service, the government stands uniquely
positioned to guard against perfidy. By its action the government
can either contribute to or eliminate the problem. Accordingly, we
expect prosecutors and investigators to take all reasonable meas-
ures to safeguard the system against treachery.1
I. Introduction
A. A Different Kind of Witness
In the early stages of a prosecutor's career, most prosecution wit-
nesses are normal citizens who, by virtue of some misfortune, have
been either the victim of, or a witness to, a criminal act. Mr. Jones, for
example, is called to the stand, and testifies that he was swindled out
of his life's savings; Mr. Wilson tells the jury about his stolen car; Mrs.
Johnson identifies the body of her son who was killed in a robbery; or
Agent Bond recounts his discovery of cocaine in the defendant's lug-
gage at the airport.
With these kinds of witnesses, character, credibility, and integrity
are usually not critical issues either during the investigation of the case
or in court. The most that can generally be expected from the other
end of the table is a defense based on the assertion that such a wit-
ness-although admittedly a good person-is simply mistaken as to
what he or she believes was seen or heard.
Sooner or later, however, another type of not-so-reliable witness
starts to make an occasional appearance on the subpoena list, and the
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
1. United States v. Bemal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted).
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prosecutor begins to venture out onto a totally different sea where he
or she is frequently ill-prepared to navigate-the watery and treacher-
ous straits of the accomplice, the co-conspirator, the snitch, and the
informer. After Mr. Jones testifies about the swindle, the swindler
himself is called to the stand in an attempt to convict the mastermind
who cooked up the scheme and who hid all the money in foreign bank
accounts. After Mr. Wilson laments the disappearance of his Merce-
des, the car thief is called in pursuit of the kingpin who runs hot Ger-
man cars into Mexico. After the mother of the murdered clerk
identifies her dead son, the defendant's cell-mate is called to recount a
jailhouse confession; and after Agent Bond identifies the cocaine, the
mule in turn points the finger of guilt at the brains of the organization.
The usual defense to this kind of criminally involved witness is
never just a polite assertion that he is mistaken. Not surprisingly, the
rejoinder ordinarily mounted amidst loud, indignant, and sometimes
even enraged accusations is that the witness is lying through his teeth
for reasons that should be patently obvious to every decent person in
the courtroom.
The prosecutor on such occasions will be surprised to discover
that his or her own personal integrity is on the line. Such an unex-
pected turn of events is not a laughing matter. It is neither helpful to
a prosecutor's case nor very comforting personally to have the defense
persuasively arguing to the court and jury, for example, that you, as a
colossal idiot, have given immunity to the real killer in order to prose-
cute an innocent man. Alan Dershowitz in his book, The Best De-
fense, describes this tactic as follows:
In representing criminal defendants-especially guilty ones-it is
often necessary to take the offense against the Government; to put
the Government on trial for its misconduct. In law as in sports, the
best defense is often a good offense.2
In this perilous world, "character," "bias," and "credibility"
aren't just interesting issues in a book about evidence-they become
the pivotal win or lose elements in the prosecution's case, from start to
finish. How these witnesses are managed and how these issues are
approached and handled when they arise may determine the success
or failure of the case.
B. Two Cardinal Considerations
There are two principal reasons why this type of frontal offensive
can be marshaled against these kinds of witnesses. The two reasons
2. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE XiV (1982).
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and their legal and tactical ramifications seem obvious enough on pa-
per but are usually not fully appreciated by a prosecutor or an investi-
gator until he or she has been in the profession long enough to
observe firsthand a case or an investigation go monumentally sour be-
cause of a treacherous witness. Working with the Joneses, the Wil-
sons, the Joknsons, and the Bonds of the world gives an unseasoned
prosecutor a false sense of security with all witnesses.
The first of the two reasons relates to the general nature of a
witness predisposed to criminality. Read it and commit the message
to memory:
1. Criminals are likely to say and do almost anything to get what
they want, especially when what they want is to get out of trouble with
the law.
This willingness to do anything includes not only truthfully spill-
ing the beans on friends and relatives, but also lying, committing per-
jury, manufacturing evidence, soliciting others to corroborate their
lies with more lies, and double-crossing anyone with whom they come
into contact, including-and especially-the prosecutor. A drug ad-
dict can sell out his mother to get a deal, and burglars, robbers, mur-
derers and thieves are not far behind. Criminals are remarkably
manipulative and skillfully devious. Many are outright conscienceless
sociopaths to whom "truth" is a wholly meaningless concept. To
some, "conning" people is a way of life. Others are just basically un-
stable people. A "reliable informer" one day may turn into a consum-
mate prevaricator the next.
In case you have any doubts about the observation that criminals
are capable of unfathomable lies under oath, consider this essentially
accurate article from the front page of the Los Angeles Times:3
Marion Albert Pruett's is an appalling but compelling story.
Held in federal prison, he bartered his way to freedom by
agreeing to testify against a prisoner accused of killing Pruett's
cellmate [who himself was scheduled to testify for the government].
In exchange, the U.S. government took him into its secret witness
security program, giving him a new identify and a new start in life.
By last October and by his own account, however, Pruett had
committed a string of bank robberies and had murdered two con-
venience store clerks near Denver, another in Fort Smith, Ark., and
a savings and loan employee in Jackson, Miss. Now back in jail,
Pruett recanted the testimony that had led to his freedom and de-
clared that he, Marion Pruett, had actually killed his cellmate.4
3. Bill Curry, New Laws Would Make Crime Pay, L.A. TrmEs, Feb. 23, 1982, at 7.
4. Id.
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Or, if Mad Dog Pruett doesn't stand up the hair on the nape of
your neck, how about the story of Willie Kemp, who, in return for
money, trumped up criminal cases against 32 innocent people as re-
counted by the National Law Journal:
Scam Exposed
For 15 months, Willie Kemp and the others had infiltrated the
Cleveland Post Office, ostensibly looking for evidence against drug
users and dealers. Flush with government money, they lived to the
hilt, renting fancy cars, living in pricey condos, wearing expensive
clothes and hosting parties.
"The inspectors had arranged for them to be hired as postal
workers, so they were getting regular paychecks," Mr. Maloney [the
ex-prosecutor] says. "But they also were being paid about $100 ex-
tra per transaction. On top of that, they were pocketing the drug
buy money the inspectors were giving them."
Prosecutors and defense attorneys believe the inspectors ob-
tained the names of postal employees who had signed up voluntarily
for substance abuse counseling. At the beginning of the investiga-
tion, it appears, agents gave informants a list of workers who could
be targets. Several of them were in drug counseling, a fact that was
supposed to be confidential ....
The postal inspectors wired their informants and sent them out
with thousands of dollars in buy money. The inspectors never saw
the targets and only heard barely audible tapes of the informants
striking up conversations and describing the deals.
Then the informants returned to the inspectors with drugs
they'd allegedly just purchased.
"If they had searched the informants, the inspectors would
have known that the informants were bringing drugs to the deal and
had the buy money hidden in their socks following the deal," says
Mr. Maloney.
The other voices on the tapes, he says, were "friends paid by
Willie Kemp and the other informants to play the role of the postal
workers." The drugs, too were phony. Bags of white powder they
said was cocaine purchased from postal employees was [sic] really
baking soda.
When Mr. Moore was arrested, a public defender recom-
mended that he plead guilty. Insisting that he was innocent, he de-
manded a trial. "I was certain that once the agents and informants
saw me in court, they would recognize I was the wrong person and I
would be immediately let go," he told the NLJ.
Instead, in a bench trial, Common Pleas Judge Richard J.
McMonagle believed the informants and found Mr. Moore guilty in
December 1992 on all four counts of drug trafficking. In February
1993, as the scheme began to unravel, the judge set aside the
conviction.
In November, Leroy Lumpkin became the last of the 32 postal
workers indicted to have his case dismissed, according to Mr. Malo-
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ney and Cuyahoga County Asst. Prosecutor Sean Gallagher, who
took over the investigation when Mr. Maloney went into private
practice last year.
Mr. Gallagher says an investigation into the inspectors' conduct
is pending.
Informants Convicted
"All of the informants involved have been convicted of perjury
and falsifying evidence and are in prison," Mr. Gallagher says. "The
focus now is on the postal inspectors. Did they know what was hap-
pening? Did they knowingly commit any crimes?"
The two inspectors in charge of the investigation-Timothy
Marshall and Daniel Kuack-were fired. Both declined requests
for interviews, and their attorneys did not return calls for comment.
The 19 postal workers fired after they were arrested in Septem-
ber 1992 have been reinstated to their jobs.5
Shades of Operation Corkscrew in Cleveland in the early 1980s
come to mind. In that embarrassing meltdown, an informer under-
cover operative who promised to make cases against allegedly
crooked judges pocketed the intended bribe money and then manu-
factured bogus tape recordings of the supposed bribes. 6 On the tapes,
the informer pretended to be a crooked judge who had just taken the
money.7 The informer and two other impostors who also falsely
played the parts of judges ended up in jail.8
The second of the two reasons why converted criminals as wit-
nesses come under such heavy fire pertains to the general disposition
of people who become jurors towards informers. To a prosecutor, it is
of equal importance as the first.
2. Ordinary decent people are predisposed to dislike, distrust, and
frequently despise criminals who "sell out" and become prosecution
witnesses. Jurors suspect their motives from the moment they hear
about them in a case, and they frequently disregard their testimony
altogether as highly untrustworthy and unreliable, openly expressing
disgust with the prosecution for making deals with such "scum."
A clear example of this hostile attitude is found in this accurate
newspaper report about a failed federal prosecution of eleven Hell's
Angels:9
5. Mark Curriden, Postal Agents Stamped by Scandal, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at
A25.
6. See Francis J. Flaherty, FBI Says It Erred In Ohio, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 12, 1983, at 6.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. William Endicott, U.S. Asks Dismissal of Hell's Angels Case After Two Mistrials,
L.A. TnEs, Feb. 26, 1981, at 3.
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After two mistrials and a cost in the millions, the government
gave up Wednesday trying to convict the notorious Hell's Angels
motorcycle gang on conspiracy and racketeering charges ....
Federal prosecutors had attempted to prove that the maverick
and frequently violent motorcycle gang had become engaged in full-
time criminal activity sometime in the 1960s and was deeply in-
volved in an extensive drug and narcotics operation in Northern
California and elsewhere, using illegal firearms, murder, threats and
assaults to further its enterprise.
But a second trial, which began last October, ended late Tues-
day with the jury of nine men and three women advising [Federal
District Judge William] Orrick it was hopelessly deadlocked. An
earlier trial which began in 1979 and concluded last July also ended
in a hung jury for most of the defendants. [The rest were acquitted.]
A juror in the latest trial ... told reporters that the vote was 9
to 3 for acquittal ...[and described] the government's key wit-
nesses, including a former Hell's Angel who admitted being paid
$30,000 in exchange for his testimony, "despicable and beneath
contempt."
And even the U.S. Attorney here ... conceded that govern-
ment witnesses were a "despicable set of characters."'10
Another graphic example of jurors' unfavorable reactions to an
informant-witness can be found in the DeLorean case. The following
is an excerpt from the American Lawyer about one of the govern-
ment's main witnesses:1
Testimony from a "Creep"
Ruthe Sutton remembers that when James Timothy Hoffman, a
jowly 43-year-old 225-pounder in a government-purchased brown
polyester suit, took the stand as the prime witness against John
DeLorean, "he never looked anyone in the eye. He was just not
believable from the minute he spoke."
"I believed nothing Hoffman said," recalls Jo Ann Kerns.
"And I kept thinking to myself, 'If Hoffman can do this to
DeLorean, he can do this to any of us."' Kerns's point should not
be mistaken for a broader argument about entrapment or sting op-
erations: "I'm all in favor of going after people if the government
knows or has reason to believe that they are dealing in narcotics.
Then anything goes. Any tricks that the government can come up
with. But here it was just Hoffman's word. And then we never saw
DeLorean on the tapes actually participate in the conspiracy."
Prosecutor Walsh took Hoffman through the story of how he
had befriended DeLorean because his son and DeLorean's had
played together when the two were neighbors near San Diego in
1980. Hoffman explained that it was the sons' friendship-not an
10. Id.
11. Steven Brill, Inside the DeLorean Jury Room, AM. LAW., Dec. 1984, at 1, 98.
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intention to try to snare DeLorean in a drug deal-that had led
Hoffman to call DeLorean two years later (on June 29, 1982)-by
which time Hoffman, coincidentally, had become a government m-
formant. "This guy's father of the year," [juror] Holladay recalls
thinking to himself. "He's using his own son to make up a story to
get money as an informant."
Why hadn't all of Hoffman's conversations with DeLorean
been taped, once DeLorean had made his supposed drug deal over-
ture? Because the equipment hadn't been available or had been
faulty, Hoffman said.
If DeLorean had really asked on June 30 whether Hoffman still
had his "connections in the Orient" necessary to do a drug deal, and
Hoffman had said yes, why had DeLorean, desperate as he was,
waited until July 11 to come to California to meet with Hoffman?
And why, asked Weitzman repeatedly, hadn't that meeting been
taped? Hoffman said he didn't know why DeLorean had waited
and that the meeting hadn't been taped because the federal agents
didn't think it was important enough to arrange for a taping on a
Sunday.
"I still figured I was pretty sure DeLorean had been in a con-
spiracy with Hetrick after Hoffman testified," says Hal Graves, "but
I knew one thing for sure: Hoffman is a pitiful, psychopathic liar-
the kind that believes what he's saying but can't tell the truth. I can
tell people like that. My own father used to tell stories and they'd
change over the years, yet he'd still believe them. That's how this
guy was."
Every juror, except Wolfe, uses words and phrases like "com-
pletely unbelievable" (Jackie Caldwell's description) in assessing
Hoffman, while Wolfe says "he was probably lying a lot." For some,
like Andersen, Sutton, Kerns, Dowell, Lahr, and Holladay-jurors
who would never see the full elements of conspiracy-this was not
as important as it was for the others, like Graves, Caldwell, Gelbart,
and Hoover. Later, their view of the case-that DeLorean had in-
deed conspired in some way with Hetrick but that Hoffman couldn't
be counted on to be telling the truth about his initial contact with
DeLorean-would be the fulcrum of the jurors' entrapment
decision.1
2
A third example of this ever present problem with jurors oc-
curred in a major federal corruption/fraud case in Los Angeles in
1985. The headline and partial text from the Los Angeles Times
follows:' 3
Jury Acquits Bank Official in Moriarty Fraud Case
A Los Angeles federal jury Monday acquitted former Orange
County bank official Nelson Halliday of conspiring with confessed
12. Steven Brill, Inside the DeLorean Jury Room, AM. LAW., Dec. 1984, at 98.
13. William Overend, Jury Acquits Bank Official in Moriarty Fraud Case, L.A. TIMES,
July 16, 1985, at 2.
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political corruption figure W. Patrick Moriarty in an alleged money
laundering-scheme.
The verdict stunned federal prosecutors and prompted a sug-
gestion by Halliday's attorney that the government may have
problems in its continuing investigation of political corruption be-
cause of Moriarty's lack of credibility as a witness.
"They flat didn't believe the man," Byron McMillan, Halliday's
attorney, said of the jury's verdict Monday afternoon. "I would love
to defend anybody with Moriarty as a complaining witness."
Charles Williamson, 49, of Garden Grove, one juror who said
he believed that Halliday was guilty on all counts, confirmed that the
jurors "simply didn't believe Moriarty's testimony."
"Had he not been on the stand maybe the evidence would have
been enough.'
14
C. How an Informer Can Sink Your Case
With the foregoing in mind, let me put a different spin on this and
confront you with some observations that color the answer to the
threshold question of whether or not to use accomplices or snitches as
witnesses in the trial of any particular case.
First, calling to the stand an actual participant/eyewitness to the
crime who knows the criminals and can easily identify them-nor-
mally a devastating witness-can backfire and have the unintended
effect of making your case worse rather than better if the eyewitness is
a crook who has bartered for some sort of consideration in return for
his testimony.
Second, evidence amounting to a complete confession-normally
the end of a defendant's chances with a jury-can actually have the
unanticipated effect of making your case weaker rather than stronger
if the witness upon whom the jury has to rely for the truth of the
testimony is a person they will not trust.
Why? Because in the hands of a skillful defense tactician, all the
liabilities and the unseverable baggage that such a witness brings to
your case, along with the "confession" or the "identification," become
the elements of reasonable doubt the defense is looking for and the
brush with which the rest of your case is then tarred. The issue of the
defendant's guilt can seep away-as it did in the Moriarty/Halliday
case-while the prosecutor attempts to defend against the forceful as-
sertions of deceit and misconduct on the part of the government's wit-
14. Id. (emphasis added).
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nesses. Once a prosecutor loses control and begins in desperation to
defend rather than prosecute, disaster is right around the corner! The
defense will go after these witnesses with everything it can find, hop-
ing to make them the vulnerable links in your chain. (Remember,
"the best defense is a good offense.")
A sure way to compound this problem is to call more informer
witnesses to the stand than you have to. As with alibi witnesses, if one
cracks, they all go down, and possibly so does your case. Listen to this
defense attorney's glee at a case too full of vulnerable witnesses:' 5
The trial of Willy Falcon and Sal Magluta will best be
remembered for the 27 informants called by prosecutors to testify,
each of whom was then decimated by the defense's tag-team ap-
proach to cross-examination. "Before the trial started," [defense at-
torney] Black concedes, "we thought the most frightening thing
would be if the government tried the case in three or four weeks,
pared it down to a handful of their major witnesses, worked on
those witnesses, put them on, and then got out and put on whatever
corroboration they had. If they did that, we thought it would be a
tougher case. Thankfully, that didn't happen."
Instead, Black and his defense teammates say, the government
called informant after informant-each more sleazy that the last-
all of whom testified against Falcon and Magluta in hopes of having
their prison terms reduced.
"[W]hat happened in this case is that their worst witnesses
spilled over and poisoned the better witnesses. We were able to
create not just reasonable doubt but to prove perjury. And 'when
you prove perjury about witnesses A, B, and C, then the jury auto-
matically distrusts witnesses D, E, and F."
[Defense attorney] Krieger agrees: "Some of the witnesses
were so bad they infected those who were not so bad."'16
According to the article, the jury foreman reported after a de-
fense verdict that the jurors distrusted the cooperating witnesses be-
cause they had so much to gain from their testimony: "The
prosecution presented so many witnesses we got inundated with evi-
dence, but it wasn't good evidence.' 7
In 1991, the Miami Herald devoted much of its front page and
first section to a negative series of stories about informers. The lead
article in the spread demonstrates how ambivalent we are about
criminals as witnesses and how their misuse can create chaos:18
15. Jim DeFede, The Impossible Victory, MIAMI NEW TiMEs, Feb. 29, 1996, at 1.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Sydney P. Freedberg & Dexter Filkens, The Shadow World of Snitches; U.S. Pays
Megabucks to Confidential Informants, MIAMI HERALD, July 21, 1991, at Al.
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Privileged criminals-lying, cheating and stealing for the
United States of America-infest the courtrooms of the land.
The government labels them CIs, or confidential informants,
and they are a booming, megabuck industry that thrives in se-
crecy-and almost no public oversight.
Some get rich. Some corrupt cops. Some fabricate testimony.
Some trap innocent people. Some get away with-if not murder-
assault, robbery, and cocaine trafficking.
Some CIs are extremely effective and proud of what they do.
"I'm a magnet for maggots," says Alex Spiegel, 41, sipping Amstel
Light at R.J.'s Landing on the Intracoastal.
Gregarious and charming, Spiegel and his breed could easily
call their shadowy enterprise Rats 'R Us.
Bankrolled by burgeoning U.S. drug forfeitures, tax bounties
and undercover funds, CIs buy leniency for themselves and twist
deftly through a sometimes-careless criminal justice system.
Lawmen argue emphatically they need rats to catch rats. Police
simply could not crack big drug and public corruption cases without
CIs. "They don't line up to meet you in the National Cathedral,"
says Thomas V. Cash, special agent in charge of Miami's Drug En-
forcement Administration office.
As the government enrolls more and more informants, almost
like an addict, questions about costs, fairness, and effectiveness in-
tensify. So do complaints.
"If Benedict Arnold were alive today, the government would
give him an ID, a Mercedes and call him a hero," says attorney Fred
Haddad. "There is such a mania over drugs. No one gives a damn
what it takes to stop it." 19
What this article should teach you among other things is how fast
the media will turn against you if something goes wrong.
D. The Question is When and How to Use Criminal Witnesses
Notwithstanding all the problems that accompany using criminals
as witnesses, however, the fact of the matter is that police and prose-
cutors cannot do without them-period. Often they do tell the truth,
and on occasion they must be used in court. If a policy were adopted
never to deal with criminals as prosecution witnesses, many important
prosecutions-especially in the area of organized and conspiratorial
crimes-could never make it to court. In the words of Judge Learned
Hand:
Courts have countenanced the use of informers from time im-
memorial; in cases of conspiracy, or in other cases when the crime
consists of preparing for another crime, it is usually necessary to
19. Id.
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rely on them or upon accomplices because the criminals will almost
certainly proceed covertly.20
Our system of justice requires percipience from a person who
would testify in court. It is a simple fact that frequently the only per-
sons who qualify as witnesses to serious crime are the criminals them-
selves. Terrorist cells are difficult to penetrate. Mafia leaders use
underlings to do their dirty work. They hold court in plush quarters
and send their soldiers out to kill, maim, extort, sell drugs, run rackets,
and corrupt public officials. To put a stop to this, to get at the bosses
and ruin their organizations, it is necessary to turn underlings against
those at the top. Otherwise, the big fish go free and all you get are the
minnows. They are criminal minnows to be sure, but one of their
functions is to assist the sharks to avoid prosecution. Snitches, inform-
ers, co-conspirators, and accomplices are therefore indispensable
weapons in a prosecutor's battle to protect a community from
criminals. For every setback such as the ones mentioned above, there
are scores of sensational triumphs in cases where the worst scum of
the earth have been called to the stand by the government. The pros-
ecutions of Charles Manson, the Watergate conspirators, the infamous
Hillside Strangler, the Grandma Mafia, the Walker-Whitworth espio-
nage ring, and the last John Gotti prosecution are only a few of the
thousands of examples of cases where such witnesses have been effec-
tively used with stunning success.
This background perspective is not designed to scare you off or
make you gun-shy but to help you to become more effective when you
are compelled to enter this arena by introducing you to the pitfalls
you may encounter. If you know where the pitfalls are, you will be
able to successfully avoid them.
The appropriate questions, therefore, are not really whether
criminals should ever be used as government witnesses, but when and
if so, how? The material covered in the following outline is designed
to do nothing more than to accomplish the two main goals of a prose-
cutor and an investigator:
(1) To discover the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth;
and
(2) To present persuasively what you have unearthed to a jury and
convince them to rely on it in arriving at a just verdict.
In this regard, there are a few important rules of thumb that should
normally be observed. The following section will outline these gen-
20. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
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eral rules. Section III will expand these principles into step by step
instructions on avoiding the worst mistakes.
H. General Rules of Thumb for the Careful Prosecutor
A. Use Little Fish
Make agreements with "little fish" to get "big fish." Jurors will
understand this approach, but they may reject out of hand anything
that smacks of giving a fat deal to a "big fish" to get a "little fish." It
will offend their notion of basic fairness and will play into the hands of
the defense. In a well known east coast legal disaster, a police chief
was let off the hook relatively easily in order to prosecute subordi-
nates. Angered at this inverted set of priorities, juries acquitted all
the subordinates. It is also the case that sometimes, even though you
have a bigger fish in mind, the one you already have in the net is
simply too big to give anything substantial in return for his coopera-
tion. Don't keep going when the stakes are no longer favorable. You
must be prepared to defend and justify the deal you have made to the
jury in compelling terms in your final argument, after it has been at-
tacked by the defense. "Why did we give this witness immunity? Be-
cause it is unacceptable to get just the bag man and let the crooked
senator get away, that's why. The integrity of government-indeed
our very way of life-demands it."
B. Drive a Hard Deal
Do not give up more to make a deal than you have to. This is a
temptation to which too many prosecutors succumb. If you have to
give up anything at all, a plea to a lesser number of counts, a reduction
in the degree of a crime, or a limitation on the number of years that an
accomplice will serve is frequently sufficient to induce an accomplice
to testify; and it sounds better to jurors when they discover that both
fish are still in the net. Total immunity from prosecution should be
used only as a last resort. Convict them and then make them testify
before the grand jury. Resort to post-conviction "use immunity" if
necessary. Sometimes if the smaller fish is firmly in the net, all you
have to give him is "an opportunity to help himself" at sentencing.
Tell him it's his choice. All you will do is advise the judge of his coop-
eration, or lack thereof, as the case may be. This frequently works
because the criminal has no other options to get what he wants.
Section 9-27.610 of the Department of Justice Manual makes it
clear as a matter of policy that if possible, an offender should be re-
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
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quired "to incur... some liability for his/her criminal conduct. '21
Non-prosecution agreements must only be used as a last resort and
should be avoided unless there is no other avenue that will lead to
your objective.22
It is a good idea to remind the defendant's attorney in a non-
threatening way that a sentencing court may properly consider the de-
fendant's refusal to cooperate in the investigation of a related criminal
conspiracy after his Fifth Amendment rights are gone.2 3 He can stand
before the judge as a person who helped or a person who did not help.
The option is his. You will be surprised how often this will be all you
need. Acceptance of responsibility becomes a premium at sentencing.
Be tough. The crook will respect you. It must appear that he needs
you, not vice versa.
C. Stay in Control
You must always be in control, not the witness! The moment you
sense that the witness is dictating terms and seizing control of the situ-
ation, you are in very deep trouble and you must reverse what has
happened. For an example of how careers can be ended if informers
are mismanaged, consider this article which chronicles the fallout
from a flawed federal prosecution in Chicago of the notorious El
Rukn street gang:24
These days however, the El Rukns are returning to court for a
reason that could scarcely have been imagined when Hogan was
convicting them: they are being released. They are being released
because of what may be one of the most significant cases of
prosecutorial misconduct in the history of the Justice Department-
prosecutorial misconduct by Bill Hogan. The convictions have
evaporated because of accusations that Hogan's cooperating wit-
nesses were given drugs and alcohol and allowed to have sex in
prison and in the prosecutors' offices, and that the prosecutors con-
doned these practices and then covered them up.2p
The full story of this catastrophe is found in United States v. Burn-
side26 and United States v. Boyd.27 Remember, you must be in control,
21. U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE MANUAL, TrTLE 9, CRIMINAL DMSION, § 9-
27.610(B)(1)(b) (1993-2 Supp.).
22. See id. for Department policy and procedure in this area.
23. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552,556 (1980) (rejecting du process and
First Amendment challenges to the use of evidence of non-cooperation as a factor in
sentencing).
24. Jeffrey Toobin, Capone's Revenge: How far can a prosecutor go to secure crucial
testimony from plea bargainers?, NEw YORKER, May 23, 1994, at 46.
25. Id.
26. 824 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D.- Ill. 1993).
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not your informers. Do not fix their parking tickets, smooth over
their rental car defalcations, or intervene in all their problems with the
law without expecting repercussions later on. Inexperienced prosecu-
tors tend to coddle such witnesses for fear of losing their testimony.
This fear stems from not understanding what drives them. The basic
deal is all you need to keep them on board. As to all the rest, they are
just using you, and you have lost control. Be resolute. If they won't
cooperate with you, get rid of them!
The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who
claims another prisoner has confessed to him. The snitch now stands
ready to testify in return for some consideration in his own case.
Sometimes these snitches tell the truth, but more often they invent
testimony and stray details out of the air:
In the seamy world of jailhouse informers, treachery has long
been their credo and favors from jailers their reward. Now lawyers
and prosecutors must ponder whether fiction was often their
method.
That is the unhappy implication behind the crisis in law en-
forcement that has been unfolding in Southern California since an
inmate, Leslie Vernon White, who has testified in many highly pub-
licized cases, demonstrated in October [1988] how he could fabri-
cate the confessions of other inmates without ever having talked
with them. He said later he had lied in a number of criminal cases.
Defense lawyers have compiled a list of 225 people convicted
of murder and other felonies, some sentenced to death, in cases in
which Mr. White and other jailhouse informers testified over the
last 10 years in Los Angeles County.
28
The precautionary rule of thumb with a jailhouse confession
presented by another inmate is that it is false until the contrary is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If you do not know how Leslie
White was able to concoct credible confessions without talking to the
alleged confessor, you had better find out.
Do not call criminals to the stand as witnesses unless, in the most
careful exercise of your judgment, such a move will significantly ad-
vance your ability to win your case. Remember, this is an area where
less can be more! When you do call an informer, be prepared for war.
The injection of a dirty witness into your own case gives tremendous
ammunition to the defense, ammunition that frequently is more pow-
erful than the benefit you expect. Here, for example, is a laundry list
27. 833 F. Supp. 1277 (N.D. II. 1993), affd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995).
28. Robert Reinhold, California Shaken Over an Informer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1989,
at Al.
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from the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of the
kinds of weaknesses your opponent will be looking for:
29
If the informant was addicted to drugs or alcohol during the
time to which the statement relates, witnesses and medical records
showing this addiction must be introduced. If the informant failed
urinalysis tests while on pretrial release and while "cooperating"
with the government, the pretrial services reports showing contin-
ued drug use should be offered. If you can document inconsisten-
cies or critical omissions between what the informant claimed
during one interview or grand jury appearance and what he said in
another, these must be carefully set forth during the hearing. Simi-
larly, any evidence you have about other false statements made by
the informant, particularly those made under penalty of perjury
(such as false statements on loan applications or tax returns) should
be introduced. Prior convictions of the informant (admissible to im-
peach credibility under Rule 609) or opinion or reputation evidence
showing the informant was not a truthful person (admissible under.
Rule 608) must be put in the record. If you have evidence tending
to show the informant had a reason to lie about your client or any
evidence of bias, it must be offered. And, of course, you need to
establish what sentence the informant was facing, what the
mandatory minimum and guideline ranges were without coopera-
tion, and what other benefits (such as immunity for relatives) the
informant got in return for his or her cooperation. All these factors
are indicia of a lack of credibility of the declarant and, hence, are
indicia of a lack of trustworthiness of his statements.30
Juries expect prosecutors to be men and women of integrity. If
you don't show the proper distance between yourself and the witness
in court, and if you haven't handled your witness correctly before-
hand, your own credibility can become suspect. A prosecutor without
credibility in court might as well throw in the towel. You must always
ask not only what the witness has to say, but also what the jury will
think (1) of the witness as a person, and (2) of you as the prosecutor,
for how you have handled the situation.
Don't try to make these tough calls by yourself. Call in an exper-
ienced prosecutor who is not involved in your case for advice. Try it
out on a friend who is not a lawyer. Your friend's reaction will sur-
prise and inform you regarding your decision.
If I were responsible for running a prosecutor's office, I would
require all assistants to run these decisions by an experienced non-
involved supervisor before going ahead. Line prosecutors are so close
to the action that they sometimes lose perspective on these issues.
29. David S. Rudolf & Gordon Widenhouse, Litigating The Admissibility Of Inform-




D. Keep Your Distance from the Witness
If you decide to call an informer as a witness, you will end up
spending much time with him preparing for his testimony. Not all
such witnesses are hard core street criminals, and some of them are
affable and will try to ingratiate themselves into your good favor. Re-
main courteous, but do not let down your guard and share the kind of
information with them you might share with a friend or colleague. To-
day, he might be testifying for you, but as in the El Rukn case, to-
morrow he may decide to turn against you. Never say anything to a
witness-or for that matter to anybody including people on your own
team-that you would not repeat yourself in open court or want to see
on the front page of the Washington Post or your hometown newspa-
per. The last witness for the defense in the DeLorean case was an ex-
DEA agent who testified that one of the prosecutors boasted of seeing
the investigative team on the cover of Time magazine. The agent
claimed that the investigation was driven by "blind zeal" to convict a
celebrity. Although this claim was untrue, it was damaging to the gov-
ernment's attempt to rebut the claim of entrapment. Assume at all
times-especially when you are on the telephone-that you are being
taped. If you want to read a chilling account of an informer who
secretly tape recorded the improper remarks of an investigator trying
to get him to cooperate, read the chapter in Alan Dershowitz's book
The Best Defense entitled "The Boro Park Connection."' 31 When the
investigator discovered for the first time on the witness stand that he
had been taped, his chair turned into a true hot seat.32
Consider also the testimony at the O.J. Simpson trial regarding
Craig Anthony Fiato, a federally protected mafia enforcer, and his
brother Larry. According to this testimony, Detective Philip Vanatter
had allegedly made statements to the Fiato brothers that were incon-
sistent with his testimony regarding the reason why he went to Simp-
son's house after Simpson's wife was found murdered. 33 These
statements to the Fiatos were used by the defense to mount a vigorous
claim that Vanatter was a perjurer. 34 Whatever Vanatter may or may
not have said to the Fiatos, both of whom were called to the stand by
the defense, it is certain that he learned (or relearned) (1) not to talk
to informers about sensitive case-related matters; and (2) that
31. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 3-84.
32. See id.
33. Andrea Ford & Jim Newton, Simpson Lawyers Say Vanatter Lied on the Stand,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1995, at Al.
34. Id.
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criminals are as prone to testify against you as they are to testify for
you. It all depends where they see the best butter for their bread.
Remember, informers are not your friends. Keep a healthy arm's
length between yourself and such a witness. In this same vein, keep
them away from strategy discussions about your case. If the witness
starts to believe he is one of the team, or a "junior G-man," he may be
tempted to try to help you by manufacturing evidence that doesn't
exist.
The agents handling informers can unintentionally cause signifi-
cant problems. The agents simply do not appreciate the courtroom
and credibility implications of getting too close to an informer witness.
In the 1995 prosecution of attorney Patrick Hallinan in Reno, Nevada,
for example, Ciro Mancuso was being used against his ex-attorney
Hallinan. The agents became very fridndly with Mancuso, even to the
point of permitting him to prepare and type their police reports (DEA
6s). Moreover, the agents permitted Mancuso to gather evidence
without supervision, evidence that the defense at trial successfully at-
tacked as fraudulent. In addition, the agents allowed Mancuso to
keep $2,000,000 in excess of the $5,000,000 already provided for in the
plea agreement, all of which went untaxed. Remarkably, the agents
also allowed Mancuso to keep a firearm, even though he was a con-
victed felon.35 All of these unnecessary mistakes evince a lack of con-
trol of the witness, and they were successfully exploited during the
trial by the defense to attack Mancuso's motives and credibility and to
besmirch the government's bona fides. The lesson here is that your
agents must be as aware as you of the need for appropriate and care-
ful handling of informers, i.e., people of questionable character who
are profiting from their cooperation. You must meet with the agents
early in an investigation to discuss this problem and to establish ap-
propriate ground rules.
In certain circumstances the defense may try to prove that your
witness, and not the defendant, actually committed the crime. The
jury argument goes like this: "Of course he has extensive knowledge
of the facts of this crime. He is the one who committed it, that is why!
Now, ladies and gentlemen, he is lying to save his own skin, en-
35. See generally Howard Mintz, Fort Reno's Obsession, AM. LAW., May 1995, at 54
(describing the personalities and politics of the case in detail); John W. Keker, Belligerence
is a Valid Defense Tactic, NAT'L L. J., May 13, 1996, at D6 (describing Hallinan's attorney's
successful cross-examination of Mancuso); Rob Haeseler, Drug Kingpin Mancuso Gets 9
Years: Cooperation with government eased punishment, S.F. CHRON., June 28, 1995, at A13
(highlighting the degree of police friendliness toward Mancuso).
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couraged by the disreputable plea bargain given to him by the
prosecutor."
III. Covering Your Bases, Step by Step
A. The Initial Contact
(1) Communicating with a Represented Witness
Your first hurdle involves ethical considerations. Is the prospec-
tive witness represented by an attorney? Has he been indicted? If so,
are you required to work through that attorney, even if you suspect
his or her integrity? The American Bar Association's Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.236 and Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1), 37 for
example, prohibit contacting a person represented by a lawyer on the
subject of the representation without going through the lawyer. Many
states have similar ethical standards for lawyers. Also, Standard 3-4.1
of the "Prosecution Function" section of the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice provides, in part, that "[a] prosecutor should not en-
gage in plea discussions directly with an accused who is represented by
defense counsel, except with defense counsel's approval. '38
If the prospective witness is under indictment and he calls you
and says that he wants to cooperate but that he doesn't want his law-
yer to know about it, be very careful. You will be confronted not just
with Fifth Amendment waivers, but Sixth Amendment waivers, which
carry a greater burden. And remember, a defendant may be able to
waive his rights, but he cannot waive your ethical obligations.
The best response is to take the witness who wants to talk to you
without his lawyer before a judge to confirm his wishes, securing for
him a new confidential lawyer if necessary. But before you do, you
must read United States v. Lopez.39 In Lopez, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the prosecutor misled the court regarding the facts sur-
rounding Lopez's request to speak directly with the prosecutor.4°
What did the Circuit believe should be done with the offending prose-
cutor? "[W]e are confident that, when there is no showing of substan-
tial prejudice to the defendant, lesser sanctions [than dismissing the
indictment], such as holding the prosecutor in contempt or referral to
the state bar for disciplinary proceedings, can be adequate to disci-
36. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1983).
37. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1980).
38. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNC-
TION (3d ed. 1993).
39. 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
40. Id. at 1464.
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pline and punish government attorneys who attempt to circumvent the
standards of their professions.
'41
Check the law of your own jurisdiction on this issue, and if you
work for the Justice Department, make sure you have a copy of the
latest Department regulations covering this area. To be protected by
these regulations, your conduct must comport with them.42 Because
these regulations were promulgated pursuant to the notice and public
comment rules of the Administrative Procedures Act,4 3 they have the
force of law, a fact of considerable importance in connection with
Model Rule 4.2.44 Please note that this model rule was amended by
the ABA in August 1995 in an attempt to counter the Department's
policy.45 As of November 1994, the Department of Justice has Profes-
sional Responsibility Officers in each office who will help you in this
area. The rules vary depending on whether and how you are dealing
with a represented person, a represented party, a formal target of a
grand jury investigation, or a represented organization.
Caveat: The law on this subject is in a state of flux. Many of the
key issues were litigated in United States v. Ferrara,46 but the result of
that litigation leaves many issues unanswered. In Ferrara, the federal
district court dismissed an attempt by the Justice Department to en-
join disciplinary action by New Mexico against an assistant United
States attorney who allegedly violated the Rules of Professional Con-
duct by talking to a represented defendant.47 The district court re-
jected the government's argument that the Supremacy Clause protects
United States attorneys from state disciplinary boards.48 However,
the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the lawsuit on appeal for
lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, leaving this issue up
in the air.49 The state bar associations and the supreme courts of
many states have indicated disagreement with the Department's pol-
41. Id. See also United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 837-42 (2d Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that suppression of evidence may be an appropriate remedy for a prosecutor's violation
of DR 7-104(A)(1)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
42. See Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1996); U.S. DEP'T
oF JusTicE MANuAL, TrrrL 9, CRumINAL DIVmsroN, § 9-13.210-260 (1995-1 Supp.).
43. Administrative Procedures Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996) (requiring agencies to
make their proposed rules public before they can be used in any way affecting citizens).
44. MODEL RuF-s OF PROFESSIONAL CoNrucr Rule 4.2 (1983).
45. See Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General, to U.S. At-
torneys (Nov. 22, 1995) (on file with the author).
46. 847 F. Supp. 964 (D.D.C. 1993), afftd, 54 F.3d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
47. 1d. at 968-70.
48. Id-
49. See United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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icy and the regulations. Congress is currently studying a bill that
would negate the Department's policy and require U.S. attorneys to
comply with state ethical rules.50 Thus, federal prosecutors must exer-
cise extreme caution when considering contact with a represented
defendant.
(2) Ongoing Crimes
A second complication with which you may be confronted in this
context is the situation in which the witness at some point during de-
briefing begins to tell you about ongoing or new crimes in the offing in
addition to those that have already happened. For a general look at
the problem of handling new or ongoing crimes that crop up during
the handling of a case, read Maine v. Moulton5 l and check the Depart-
ment's regulations on the subject.
This particular hurdle can become unusually touchy when the
witness with whom you are dealing is an attorney who himself is under
suspicion of criminal conduct and suddenly offers up his own clients
with respect to new or ongoing offenses in return for leniency or im-
munity. This rare but real situation should immediately set off loud
alarm bells in your analytical mind, raising questions of privilege, Fifth
Amendment rights, Sixth Amendment rights, conflict of interest, and
disciplinary rules, especially if the suggestion is made that the attorney
wear a wire and question his clients with respect to crimes in progress.
If you are not extremely cautious, you may succeed in convicting the
attorney's clients, but you may do so at the expense of your own li-
cense to practice law, a kamikaze mission that I do not recommend.
The case of United States v. Ofshe52 provides a graphic example of
the problems lurking in this situation. The bottom line for prosecutors
is found in footnote six of the opinion which reads as follows:
While we have not found the government's conduct [in using
attorney Glass to make a case against his client Ofshe] sufficiently
50. The bill would require that "an attorney for the government shall be subject to
state laws and rules, and federal local rules, governing attorneys in each State where such
attorney engages in that attorney's duties to the same extent as other attorneys in that
State." H.R. 3386, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
51. 474 U.S. 159 (1988) (holding that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel was violated when a wired confidential informant prodded him into making incriminat-
ing statements about new crimes).
52. 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1987). In Ofshe, one of the defendant's attorney's began
cooperating with the government because of an unrelated investigation into the lawyer's
own criminal activities. He wore a hidden wire while talking to his client. He convinced
his client to request numerous continuances of his trial while eliciting ever more informa-
tion. Ild. at 1510-12.
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outrageous to warrant the dismissal of his Indictment, we do believe
that [the attorney's and the Assistant United States Attorney's] con-
duct was reprehensible. Because the district judge is more familiar
with the attorneys' conduct, we assume he will refer the matter to
The Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission... for ap-propriate action. 3
Ofshe was a drug case in which no lives were directly at risk.
Would the analysis differ if the ensnared lawyer were to have come to
you and reported that his client with his knowledge had engaged the
services of an unknown contract killer to murder a witness, or a prose-
cutor, or a judge? Probably so, based on the elements of the outra-
geous government conduct test that requires an examination of the
totality of the circumstances, 54 but this remains another area in which
one should tread with great caution.
(3) The Common Defense Camp
Take great care in the debriefing of any recruited codefendant
you plan to use against his cohorts to avoid "invading the common
defense camp." If the witness without warning begins to tell you the
particulars of a defense strategy meeting he has attended with his co-
defendants and their attorneys, you are in trouble. This pitfall can
easily be avoided from the beginning by advising the witness in writing
not to tell you about any such meeting.
B. Who Goes First, You or the Witness?
(1) Get a Proffer
The first problem that usually arises is the "Catch 22" situation
where you want to know exactly what the witness has to offer before
committing yourself to a "deal," but the witness, even though desirous
of cooperating, is afraid to talk for fear of incriminating himself unless
he is promised something first. When you get into such a situation,
never buy a pig in a poke! If you first give a criminal absolute immu-
nity from prosecution or commit irrevocably to a generous deal and
then ask him what he knows, the probability is that you will get noth-
ing but hot air. Remove the witness' incentive to cooperate and you
will lose all the fish, both big and little. Never forget that they are
53. Id. at 1516 n.6.
54. See id. at 1516; see also MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL Co Nrucr Rule 1.6(b)
(1983) (allowing an attorney to breach the duty of confidentiality when the attorney be-
lieves that his or her client is about to commit a criminal act that will result in imminent
death or substantial bodily injury).
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almost always cooperating because you have them in a trap. Open the
door too early and their willingness to cooperate will evaporate.
The answer to this seeming dilemma is very simple. Get a prof-
fer! Promise the witness in writing that you will not use what he tells
you at this stage of the proceedings against him, but make it equally
clear that your decision whether or not to make a deal will not be
made until after you have had the opportunity to assess both the value
and the credibility of the information. I tell them: "It's an opportunity
to help yourself; take it or leave it." If they don't trust you enough to
go first, how in the world are you going to trust them? You can talk
possibilities, but that is all! And remember, once you have committed
to something, your word must be as good as gold, both with respect to
what you will do if the witness delivers and what you will do if he
doesn't. Caveat: If the witness later tells you something different from
what he told you in the proffer, Brady v. Maryland55 is implicated.
(2) Put it in Writing
Make sure that the full extent of the preliminary understanding is
in writing and signed by all parties. Try to anticipate all problems that
you may be confronted with down the road. Consider adding a "Mez-
zanatto provision," by which the informer agrees that any statements
he makes during meetings and negotiations can be used to impeach
any contradictory testimony he might give at his own trial should co-
operation break down.56
Remember, the document may come back to haunt you if it is
badly drafted. Make sure you examine it as a probable court exhibit
and try to avoid drafting it so it can somehow be used against you, or
that you can't use it yourself. Do not forget that your side of the
agreement-immunity or whatever-will be used in court by the de-
fense as the "reason the witness is lying." The defense will character-
ize it as a "payoff," a "bribe," etc. Do not cause yourself unnecessary
problems by giving away too much.
Do not negotiate on tape. Transcribing the tapes may drive you
to distraction. At the same time, do not try to hide anything. Be per-
suasive, but not coercive, with respect to your attempts to convince a
55. 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963) (holding that due process requires prosecutors to turn
exculpatory evidence over to the defendant).
56. United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 804 (1995) (holding that such a provi-
sion is a valid waiver of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 11(e)(6)).
criminal to be cooperative. This is a fine line, but it must be respected.
Coercive tactics may backfire.
(3) Side Deals
Probe for "side-deals" with the police. If they exist, get them out
in the open. The defense is entitled to know everything that the wit-
ness or his relatives or friends for that matter have been promised in
return for cooperation. If for the first time on cross-examination the
jury finds out that the chief investigator on the case has been paying
the witness $100 a week pending the trial or fixing his parking tickets,
you will be in deep trouble.
C. Extracting Information from the Witness
First, do not forget the appearances of your initial encounter with
the witness. A prosecutor must never conduct such an interview with-
out an investigator present. Never say anything to a crook that you do
not want repeated in open court. He may be taping you!
Once the preliminary understanding is arrived at and the witness
is now prepared to tell you what he or she knows about the case, the
suspect, etc., precautions must still be taken to get the witness to tell
the whole truth, not just parts of it.
Your first line of defense here is the witness' attorney. Impress
the requirements of absolute honesty and full disclosure on the wit-
ness' attorney and ask the attorney to have a private discussion with
the witness to try to pound this into the witness' skull. These wit-
nesses invariably hold back information that makes themselves "look
bad." It is devastating in front of a jury to find out that the first thing
such a witness did was lie to the prosecutor or the case agent! Delib-
erate omissions are just as bad as outright lies. Don't start the inter-
view until the attorney assures you that he believes that his client is
ready to come completely clean.
When you start the interview, repeat the necessity of complete
"honesty" and "full disclosure." Discuss perjury, liability for false evi-
dence, etc. The objective is to "get at the truth," not to "get the sus-
pect." Let the witness know that if he gets to court, the truth will
certainly come out on cross-examination. Tell him that the defendant
isn't going to sit there and let him gild the lily. You want to hear it
now, not later. One frequent problem confronted here is that the wit-
ness will falsely minimize his own role in the scheme. Warn him not to
do this and be on the lookout for evidence that this is what he is do-
ing. It will stand out like a sore thumb, if you are looking for it.
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One incredible mistake I've seen made on more than one occa-
sion-especially by agents-is to listen to the informer's story and
then tell him, "That's not enough, you'll have to come up with more."
The impetus for such a statement comes from agents' knowledge that
informers hold some material back, but such a can opener should not
be used for two reasons. First, the informer may react by making up
"better stuff," an eventuality for which you do not want to be respon-
sible. Second, when jurors become aware of such a tactic, they will
become very willing to believe that you and your agents have solicited
false information. This mistake played a significant role in the failed
prosecution of attorney Patrick Hallinan in Reno, Nevada, in 1995.
When the jurors found out that the cooperating informer Mancuso
had not fingered his own lawyer Hallinan until after agents told him
he needed to come up with more, the force of the government's case
slipped away.
Do not feed the witness key information. First, let the witness tell
the complete story on his or her own; then ask any questions needed
to fill in the gaps. One of your best jury arguments is that "the witness
must have been there (or talked in confidence to the defendant) be-
cause he knows details that only somebody who was there would
know!" Don't give this away by being arguably the source of the in-
side information. Make sure everybody on your team understands
this and doesn't let the cat out of the bag. The investigators should
watch for this kind of evidence during the interview and make good
discoverable notes.
The defendant knows more about the informer than you do! This
advantage may enable the defendant to mount an attack on cross ex-
amination, etc., based on facts or circumstances of which you are una-
ware and about which the informer has not told you. To avoid being
caught unprepared, ask the informer what the defendant might bring
up to discredit him or his testimony. Take your time on this because
you're now probing for information that the informer may not want to




Experts say it is rare for prosecutors to face defense attorneys
who know more about the government's witnesses than the govern-
ment itself does. But that is exactly what happened in the Willy and
Sal case. In addition to spending untold millions on attorneys, Fal-
57. DeFede, supra note 15, at 1.
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con and Magluta also hired a score of private investigators who
fanned out across the United States and throughout Latin America
to track down incriminating information about the government's
witnesses. "What made the difference was the fact that Sal Magluta
and Willy Falcon were willing to fight this and fund an investigation
that could expose all of these things," says [defense attorney] Black,
who adds this victory to a growing string of wins, including his rep-
resentation of William Kennedy Smith and former Miami police of-
ficer William Lozano. "How many people can afford to hunt these
things down? Do you know how many witnesses we investigated
before the trial? They called about 30 accomplice witnesses, but
they had given us notice on their witness list of about 81, and added
4 or 5 just before trial."
Among the government's many witnesses, Nestor Galeano
proved to be a favorite of the defense team. His testimony, they
believe, was also a turning point in the case. Before the trial com-
menced, defense attorneys obtained several letters Galeano had
written in prison to a friend in Columbia, fellow cocaine smuggler
Manuel Garces. In those letters, Galeano eloquently explained his
belief that the American justice system is corrupt, and that the only
way to deal with it is to play along, to do whatever it takes to get out
of prison, including, defense attorneys claimed, lying on the witness
stand to please prosecutors. "Those letters were an overwhelming
embarrassment to the government," says [defense attorney] Krie-
ger. "Or at least they should be."58
Be on the lookout for any telltale suggestions that the informer is
really the one who committed the crime under investigation and that
he is falsely casting the blame on someone else to save his own skin.
If he knows much of the inside information about the crime, the de-
fense may argue that he learned it not from the defendant, but be-
cause he is the perpetrator! To understand the dimensions and
ramifications of such a defense, read Kyles v. Whitley.59
D. Test the Witness' Story
(1) What Motivates the Witness?
Do not be afraid to subject the story and the witness to intense
scrutiny and cross-examination. Do not fear that the witness will
crack. If he does, it's better that it happen in your office than in court.
Prosecutors without much experience tend to treat such witnesses far
too softly for fear they will not hold up. This is wrong. Bear down!
58. Id
59. 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1571-73 (1995) (holding that the prosecution's failure to divulge
evidence tending to inculpate the government's witness and exculpate the defendant de-
nied the defendant due process).
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Mistrust everything he says. Be actively suspicious. Look for corrob-
oration on everything you can; follow up all indications that he may be
fudging. Secure information on the witness' background: mental
problems, probation reports, prior police reports. Contact prior pros-
ecutors who have either prosecuted the witness or used him in court
and read the sentencing memoranda from previous cases. What do
the prosecutors think about his credibility? How did the jurors react
to him? Was he a helpful witness or was he more trouble than he was
worth?
Assess the motivation of the witness. Why did he decide to cross
over? You must understand why he has turned in order to keep him
on your side once he has crossed over. This understanding will keep
you from making mistakes caused by thinking you have to be friendly
and generous to keep him on the team. Normally he will stay with
you so long as the carrot he seeks is still in the future.
On occasion you will get a witness who is really and truly sorry
for what he did. Play this for all it's worth with the jury-but first
make absolutely sure that the sentiment is real. Usually it is phony.
Be wary of drug addicts. Consider a medical examination and
find out from a doctor the effect of the drug your witness abuses on
his capacity as a witness. Does valium ruin your memory? You might
want to call the doctor during your case-in-chief.
If your witness is "on loan" from a foreign government where due
process is not a high priority, be careful the witness has not been given
a script or a mission. Wang v. Reno 60 chronicles the tale of an assis-
tant United States attorney caught in the deadly fallout caused by an
informer witness who took the stand for the government, lied on di-
rect, and then subsequently revealed his lie, explaining that he was
under pressure by the government of the People's Republic of China
falsely to incriminate the defendant. Now the witness is seeking asy-
lum in this country because he fears that he will be killed if he returns
to China, and the U.S. attorney is under investigation for allegedly
lying to the court and committing other ethical violations as this mess
unraveled. 61
(2) Corroborate
The key to whether or not a jury will accept the testimony of a
criminal is the extent to which the testimony is corroborated. Devitt
60. 81 F.3d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1996).
61. Dan Weikel, When the Prosecutor is Guilty, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1994, at Al.
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and Blackmar 17.06,62 which allows the conviction of a defendant
based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, may protect
you from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29,63 but it will cut very
little ice with jurors.
In its discussion of the Friedman corruption case (prosecuted by
Rudy Giuliani), the New York Times put it this way: -
The Government's greatest strength in the case was also its
greatest weakness: Mr. Lindenauer. His strength was his intimate
knowledge of the bribery and extortion schemes that suffused the
parking bureau, and his ability to describe them at length and in
detail on the witness stand; his weakness was that he had been part
of the scheme, and collected nearly $250,000 from it, working in
concert with Mr. Manes.
Mr. Lindenauer pleaded guilty last March to federal charges of
racketeering and mail fraud, reduced from a 39-count indictment as
part of an agreement with the Government for his testimony. He
faces a prison term of 25 years and $500,000 in fines, but is not ex-
pected to be sentenced until his role is completed in other trials
relating to the municipal scandal.
Mr. Lindenauer had a long history of lying and other fraudu-
lent behavior, which defense lawyers forced him to admit during his
cross-examination and exploited as they sought to undermine his
credibility. But piece by piece, portions of his testimony were corrob-
orated by other Government witnesses. In the end, the jury of seven
women and five men agreed with Mr. Giuliani, returning guilty ver-
dicts on all but a handful of counts against the four defendants.65
Check out everything your witness says. Look for documentary
evidence, corroborating witnesses, prior consistent statements-
everything. If he says he made an important telephone call, bring in
the phone company records. If he says he was in Las Vegas, prove it
independently of what he says with hotel. clerks and records. In a
well-publicized espionage case in Los Angeles, the person who passed
secret documents to the spy testified that he received money in return,
which he put into his bank account. The prosecutor corroborated this
with excellent charts and bank and payroll records, showing conclu-
sively that he put more money than he earned from his salary into his
account while he was spying. The excess matched his statement to the
FBI and his testimony with regard to the amounts of the payoffs. In
62. EDWARD J. DEVYrT & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACtiCE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 17.06 (1992).
63. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 allows the defendant to move for acquittal
before submission of the case to the jury.
64. Richard J. Meislin, Friedman is Sentenced to 12 Years in Corruption Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1987, at B14.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
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United States v. Martinez,66 the prosecutor was allowed to prove that
others against whom the witness had informed pleaded guilty, in order
to rebut Martinez' attack on the witness' motives and credibility.67
Martinez holds that when the defense attacks a witness' credibility,
evidence that might not have been admissible on direct can be ad-
duced on redirect to rehabilitate the witness.
68
(3) Wire the Witness
Never overlook the appropriate opportunity to have your witness
contact the suspect to try to extract from him some incriminating
statements-on tape, of course. This is dynamite if you can get it.
Your investigator will help you and the witness come up with a plausi-




Consider the polygraph, but don't use it just because it's there.
The machine is fallible! It is a tool, not a guarantee. Many exper-
ienced prosecutors will counsel you not to use it on a bet. Criminals
testifying as witnesses are notorious for setting polygraph tests on
their ears. In a major case against ultra right wing terrorists, the pros-
ecutors made "the deal" contingent on passing the polygraph.
Although they became convinced that the witness was telling the
truth, he couldn't pass the test. The defense had a field day with this
on cross-examination, and the prosecutors now cite this as a mistake.
Talk to your polygraph operator about its efficacy. Don't refer to it in
court if you use it as an investigative tool.
The latest from the Supreme Court on polygraph results and
Brady is Wood v. Bartholomew,70 holding that polygraph results are
not Brady material, per se.
(5) Anticipate the Defense View
The best way to anticipate the downside to many a witness is to
cast yourself in the role of the defense attorney for your suspect. How
66. 775 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1985).
67. Id. at 36-38.
68. Id. at 37.
69. 377 U.S. 201,206 (1964) (holding that a prosecutor's use of a confidential inform-
ant to elicit information from a represented defendant violates the Sixth Amendment).
70. 116 S.Ct. 7, 11 (1995) (holding that Brady did not compel the prosecution to dis-
close that its witness failed polygraph tests when the defense counsel admitted that such
information would not have affected his cross-examination of the witness).
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would you attack this witness and his testimony if you were defending
your target? Hire yourself, as if you were to take the other side of the
case. What does it look like from that side of the tracks? Then cross
back over and ask: Can the weaknesses be explained? Spend a lot of
time at this exercise. Call in a friend to help you. Every minute will be
well worth it. It enables you to determine how to shore up your wit-
ness before the defense even gets to him. Do not pass up any oppor-
tunity you can find to watch defense attorneys cross examine
cooperating criminals. Then you will be able to anticipate and to pre-
pare for the onslaught.
E. The Agreement
If you're convinced, negotiate a final agreement; but don't give
up too much, and don't give it away too soon!
(1) Cash Rewards
Put the total agreement in writing, but before you do, read United
States v. Dailey.71 This case contains a very educational discussion
about what a plea agreement can and cannot say.72 Rewards and pay-
ments are tricky. Money-for a witness will be trouble if not handled
openly and with clean hands. There exists no outright legal prohibi-
tion against rewards, and indeed they have been sanctioned on the
grounds of public policy interests in bringing witnesses to crimes for-
ward with their information.73 Payments to an informer on a contin-
gency basis, however, may be viewed as an inducement to
entrapment.74 If a witness asks for some sort of a "cut" or "percent-
71. 759 F.2d 192,200 (1st Cir. 1985) (reversing a district court's refusal to allow a co-
defendant's testimony because the plea agreements were likely to cause perjurious
testimony).
72. Id-
73. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1012 (1996) (authorizing punishment of those who accept
rewards with the intent to defraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1751(g) (1996) (authorizing the Attorney
General to pay up to $100,000 for information about people intending to kidnap or kill the
President); 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1996) (authorizing the Secret Service to offer rewards of in-
formation or other services); 18 U.S.C. § 3059 (1996) (establishing a fund for rewards in the
Treasury); United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203, 210-12 (1842) (citing with ap-
proval the British common law public policy favoring testimony by those given rewards for
their participation in criminal prosecutions); United States v. Valle-Ferrer, 739 F.2d 545,
546-47 (11th Cir. 1984) (allowing witness testimony offered on a "contingent fee" basis);
United States v. Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 1535-40 (11th Cir. 1983) (approving a "bounty"
statute on policy grounds), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1108 (1984).
74. But see United States v. Civella, 666 F.2d 1122, 1129 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding a
conviction where the informant was paid according to the quality of the information
produced).
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age" or "reward," such a request may be discoverable even if it is
turned down. By way of example, consider this New York Times cov-
erage of this issue in the DeLorean case:
75
Federal District Judge Robert M. Takasugi today characterized
James Timothy Hoffman, the Government's informer and star wit-
ness in John Z. DeLorean's trial on narcotics charges, as "a hired
gun."
He said he found it "quite offensive" that the Government had
failed to disclose sooner that Mr. Hoffman had "demanded" a share
of any money seized in the case.
Mr. Hoffman instigated the Government's investigation of Mr.
DeLorean when he told a Government agent in 1982 that Mr.
DeLorean had asked him for help arranging a narcotics deal.
Mr. DeLorean's lawyers, Mr. Weitzman and Donald M. Re,
contended that the prosecution had improperly withheld documents
that would lead them to learn last week that Mr. Hoffman had de-
manded up to 10 percent of any assets seized as a result of the inves-
tigation of Mr. DeLorean. Mr. Hoffman made the demand Sept. 3,
1982 and was rejected.
The Government had hoped to seize several million dollars in
cash and property belonging to William Morgan Hetrick, an admit-
ted cocaine smuggler charged with Mr. DeLorean as a co-conspira-
tor, and $2 million that was to have been invested by Mr. DeLorean,
according to the Government's version of the purported drug
scheme.
Judge Takasugi, saying he was addressing the issue in "real
world" terms characterized Mr. Hoffman's demand as "a percent-
age of the take," and said he found it "quite offensive," particularly
since Mr. Hoffman had testified that he was "motivated in part by
good" to furnish information.
"If there is such a thing as a smoking gun in terms of the credi-
bility of Mr. Hoffman," the judge said, Mr. Hoffman's demand wasit.76
Although a reward or a monetary inducement does not automati-
cally disqualify the recipient as a competent witness, the jury must be
advised of the arrangement. The issue is not one of competency, it is
one of credibility; and that is an issue for the jury.77 In my opinion,
juries look askance at any arrangement whereby a prosecution witness
will benefit financially from his testimony. So do some judges. Read
75. Judith Cummings, DeLorean Witness Called Hired Gun, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
1984, at B7.
76. Id.
77. See United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 563 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the
effect of a contingency fee arrangement between the prosecutor and the witness on the
witness' credibility is an issue for the jury).
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what Judge Wiggins has to say about money and informers in United.
States v. Cuellar.78
Make sure that the agreement will make sense to the jury if it
ever gets in evidence, but be aware of the law that governs how plea
agreements can and cannot be used. They are not automatically ad-
missible in their entirety in evidence!79 Consider adding a paragraph
to the effect that, if the witness backs out, everything that he has said
during the negotiations can be used against him. 0
(2) Avoid Scripting
Don't lock the witness in so strongly to a particular evidentiary
script that the ground rules violate the defendant's rights to confronta-
tion. If you require a witness to stick to his or her original story in
order to secure a "deal," this effectively makes the witness immune
from cross-examination! Such agreements have produced reversals
on appeal! All you can require substantively is that the witness tell
the truth.81
(3) Tell the Witness All the Ground Rules
Make sure the witness has a clear understanding of what he will
have to do in terms of testifying, i.e., grand jury, two trials, or
whatever. Tell him how long it will take. Do not underestimate!
Also, he does not have a credit card to go around committing
other crimes while you are using him as a witness. Tell him not to call
you if he gets a parking ticket. Do not leave this to the imagination.
Security precautions may be in order. Decide what is necessary;
what is available. If the witness is going into a witness security pro-
gram, make sure that you and the witness understand exactly what
78. 96 F.3d 1179, 1183-89 (9th Cir. 1996) (Wiggins, J., concurring) (decrying the pay-
ment of over half a million dollars to an informant in exchange for his testimony).
79. See United States v. Edwards, 631 F.2d 1049, 1051-52 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
the existence of a cooperation agreement may be elicited by the government on direct
examination without detail, although greater detail would be allowed on redirect if the
witness' credibility is attacked based on the agreement); United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d
320, 323-24 (D.C. Cir.) (holding a cooperation agreement admissible), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 938 (1993).
80. See United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 730 n.16 (2d Cir.) (example of such
language), cert denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797,
805 (1995) (holding that plea agreement waivers of admissibility are valid for this purpose).
81. See People v. Medina, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133, 151 (Cal. 1974) (reversing a conviction
where the informants had agreed not to change their testimony from the version previously
given to the police or to resort to silence on the stand).
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this entails. Get a copy of the witness' memorandum of understand-
ing with the Marshal's Service and read it yourself.
(4) Hold Something Back
The witness must perform first. If you give him everything to
which he is "entitled" before he testifies, you may be unpleasantly
surprised when he disintegrates on the witness stand. I prefer, if pos-
sible, to have such a witness plead guilty before testifying and be sen-
tenced afterwards. If the witness' motivation to cooperate is removed,
you will be lost. Do not rely on his sense of honor! See United States
v. Insana82 and Darden v. United States,83 which sanction this
approach.
(5) Put the Statement in Writing
Have the witness execute a signed and witnessed statement re-
garding what he knows that can be used in case he goes sour, either
during the trial or later. This will be available as an admissible prior
inconsistent statement should he "go south" on the stand and as pro-
tection for you and the case after a conviction if he decides to change
his tune when confronted as a "snitch" in prison by other inmates.
Take out an insurance policy, as it were. Be familiar with the law of
impeaching your own witness, prior inconsistent statements, prior
consistent statements, etc. A case on this subject that ought to be read
by all prosecutors intending to use a turncoat as a witness is United
States v. DiCaro,84 one of the leading cases on the subject of witnesses
who are "overcome by amnesia" when they take the stand. The latest
word by the Supreme Court on attempting to use a co-conspirator's
statement as a declaration against penal interest can be found in Wil-
liamson v. United States,85 holding that confessions of arrested accom-
plices may be admitted under Rule 804(b)(3) "if they are truly self-
inculpatory rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor."
The Supreme Court has used a similar approach with respect to prior
82. 423 F.2d 1165, 1168 (2d Cir.) (holding that the prosecution did not exert undue
influence on its witness by delaying sentencing until after the witness testified), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 841 (1970).
83. 405 F.2d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that the practice of delaying sentenc-
ing until after the cooperating witness testifies does not amount to coerced testimony).
84. 772 F.2d 1314, 1322 (7th Cir. 1985) (approving of the allowance of a false "amne-
siac" witness' prior grand jury testimony into evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986).
85. 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2436 (1994).
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consistent statements: they will be admissible only if they were made
before the alleged motive to fabricate or improper influence arose.
86
F. Is Your Case Stronger Without Calling the Informer to the Witness
Stand?
Quite possibly the most effective (and safest) way to use a coop-
erating accomplice is to use the information obtained from him to de-
velop other evidence of your target's guilt, independent evidence
strong enough to relieve you of the necessity of calling him to the
stand. In fact, this should be your tactical goal: to build a case that
does not depend on the testimony of the accomplice. Use him to help
you do this. Ask him if he knows of any independent way to corrobo-
rate what he tells you. He may be useful in identifying other excellent
witnesses to what he has told you.
For a blueprint of how to use an informer's tape recorded conver-
sation with a suspect without calling the informer to the stand, read
United States v. Davis87 and United States v. McClain.s8 In both, the
government's tactic of keeping a notorious informer off the stand sur-
vived objections based on the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rules of
Evidence 607 and 806.
Remember, however, that such an approach should not be used
dishonestly to milk helpful information from a witness and then un-
fairly dump him without consideration on the proverbial ash heap.
The integrity of your office requires that you play fair, even with
criminals. A witness you may decide not to call to the stand may nev-
ertheless have given you sufficient assistance in building your case to
merit substantial consideration.
G. Managing the Witness' Environment
Be mindful of where the witness is going after you take his state-
ment and secure his cooperation. If he is going back to jail, serious
problems may occur unless you take precautions to keep him away
from other potential troublemakers. If he goes back into the "general
population," chances are some other inmate will find out he is a snitch
and confront him as an enemy. When this happens, it is not unusual
for the witness to lie to his accuser and deny everything or worse, to
say that he was coerced into lying by you and the police. You then
have a scared witness who may recant all, and you have a defense
86. See Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 705 (1995).
87. 890 F.2d 1373, 1379 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1092 (1990).
88. 934 F.2d 822, 832 (7th Cir. 1991).
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witness who will come in and tell the jury that your witness said he
made it all up "just to get a deal," etc. These people also have a dis-
quieting way of showing up unexpectedly as the predicate for a writ of
error coram nobis or a motion for a new trial. One answer to this
problem, of course, is to take advantage of the federal Witness Secur-
ity Program which has a very effective chapter behind bars as well as
on the outside.
You must keep the witness out of harm's way. Warn him against
saying anything to anybody and especially to other prisoners, and have
your investigator contact him frequently to keep the fires of coopera-
tion burning. If you neglect the baby-sitting aspects of this business,
you will get burned. If you do have access to a witness security pro-
gram, know what it can do for you, how it does it, and what it can't.
Then use it! If you don't have one available, start one. It is an essen-
tial ingredient of the fight against organized crime. Take note: if you
fail to protect your witness and he gets killed or injured because he is
cooperating, you may find yourself on the short end of a civil law suit.
To understand your exposure, read Miller v. United States,89 Galanti v.
United States,90 and Wallace v. Los Angeles.91
Please take a moment in this regard to reflect on the tragic and
sobering fate of Collier Vale, as recounted by the Los Angeles
Times:92
Collier Vale was one of the most respected lawyers in the Mon-
terey County district attorney's office, a driven prosecutor who won
numerous high-profile convictions and was a prime candidate for a
judgeship.
But after 10 years as a prosecutor, where he frequently worked
60 to 70 hours a week and slowly rose through the ranks in the of-
fice, Vale felt that a single case had ruined his reputation and de-
stroyed his career.
On a Thursday evening last month, after telling friends he was
tired of defending himself against accusations that never seemed to
end, Vale put a pistol in his mouth and pulled the trigger.
89. 561 F. Supp. 1129, 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that the government had a duty
to protect its informant but not his girlfriend because she had no special relationship with
the police), affd, 729 F.2d 1448 (3d Cir. 1984).
90. 709 F.2d 706, 710 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that the government owed no duty of
care to a bystander killed as part of the assassination of a government informant), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984).
91. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 121-27 (1993) (holding that the police owed a duty of care to
their witnesses and had no governmental immunity to suit).
92. Miles Corwin, Informant's Murder Led Prosecutor to Suicide, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5,
1990, at Al.
[Vol. 47
WORDS OF WARNING FOR PROSECUTORS
The case that friends say led to Vale's suicide involved the
death of a confidential informant in one of his murder investiga-
tions. He was unjustly blamed for the woman's death, his col-
leagues say, and he was haunted by the case.
His ordeal highlights the pressures and responsibilities prosecu-
tors face when dealing in the shadowy world of confidential infor-
mants. It is a world where prosecutors try to protect people who
sometimes can't be protected, where blame is quickly assigned
when the interests of witnesses and suspects suddenly collide.
Collier's case was a "prosecutor's nightmare," said Ann Hill, a
deputy district attorney who worked with Vale. "What makes it so
frightening is something like this could happen to any of us, no mat-
ter how conscientious we are... and Collier was maybe the most
conscientious of us all."
Vale's informant was killed in a burst of automatic gunfire, af-
ter her identity was inadvertently revealed. Local press reports ap-
peared to blame Vale for the mix-up, and the story eventually
received national attention on the tabloid television show, "A Cur-
rent Affair." Vale was extremely upset, friends said, when the con-
troversy became a major issue in the June election campaign for
district attorney.
When the family of the murdered informant filed a wrongful
death suit against the county and a local police department, Vale
knew he would soon face a series of hostile depositions and possibly
an embarrassing, highly publicized trial.
Vale, 39, was a proud man, friends said, and he could no longer
endure the indignity of being constantly blamed for a witness's
death.
"Collier saw this whole thing as humiliation and a failure," said
his girlfriend Melinda Young. Her eyes filled with tears and she
slowly shook her head. "He just couldn't let it go." 93
H. Discovery
The defense has a right to everything that reflects on the credibil-
ity of the witness-maybe even your "work product" notes as a "state-
ment of a government witness. ' 94 If you put something on paper,
expect that it will have to be turned over. If it does, you won't be
embarrassed. If it doesn't, so be it. Don't forget United States v. Har-
ris,95 which required the FBI to preserve rough notes of witness inter-
views. If you have any doubt about a piece of evidence, that very
doubt should cause you to seek a pretrial Brady ruling from the court,
93. Id.
94. See Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 101-08 (1976) (holding that a prosecu-
tor's notes taken during a witness interview may well be statements under the Jencks Act);
see also United States v. Oqbuehi, 18 F.3d 807, 810-811 (9th Cir. 1994) (following
Goldberg).
95. 543 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1976).
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ex parte, in camera if possible. If you haven't read Giglio v. United
States96 in a while, you might want to do so.
On April 19, 1995, the Supreme Court decided a very important
case discussing a prosecutor's Brady duty to disclose "favorable evi-
dence" to the defense, Kyles v. Whitley.97 If you are a prosecutor and
have not read this case, you must do so immediately because it estab-
lishes certain affirmative discovery duties on the part of a prosecutor
that, if neglected, may wreak havoc with your work. Kyles involves a
prosecutor's failure in a murder case to turn over to the defense: (1)
impeachment evidence concerning key eyewitnesses; and (2) inconsis-
tent statements made by an informant, Beanie, who was never called
to the stand but who the defense claimed was the real killer of defend-
ant Kyles' alleged victim. 98 Because five Justices decided that, had
this evidence been turned over to the defense, a different result was
reasonably probable, Kyles' conviction and death sentence were
overturned.9 9
In rendering this decision, the Court held that a prosecutor has an
affirmative duty to inquire promptly of all agencies involved in the
case whether evidence favorable to the defense exists. 100 Justice Sou-
ter described this duty as follows:
While the definition of Bagley materiality in terms of the cumu-
lative effect of suppression must accordingly be seen as leaving the
government with a degree of discretion, it must also be understood
as imposing a corresponding burden. On the one side, showing that
the prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown to
the defense does not amount to a Brady violation, without more.
But the prosecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed,
must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely
net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point
of "reasonable probability" is reached. This in turn means that the
individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case,
including the police. But whether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in
meeting this obligation (whether, that is, a failure to disclose is in
good faith or bad faith, see Brady, 373 U.S., at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-
1197), the prosecution's responsibility for failing to disclose known,
96. 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (finding defendant's due process rights were violated
where information on a deal granting a prosecution witness immunity in exchange for testi-
mony was not given to the defendant even though the prosecutor who tried the case was
unaware of the deal his office had made with the witness).
97. 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995).
98. Id. at 1563.
99. Id. at 1575.
100. Id. at 1567-69.
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favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is
inescapable.
This means, naturally, that a prosecutor anxious about tacking
too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence. See
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108, 96 S.Ct. at 2399-2400 ("IT]he prudent prose-
cutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure"). This is
as it should be. Such disclosure will serve to justify trust in the pros-
ecutor as "the representative.., of a sovereignty... whose interest
•.. in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55
S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). And it will tend to preserve
the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor's private delibera-
tions, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal
accusations.... The prudence of the careful prosecutor should not
therefore be discouraged. 1' 1
Kyles is not the first case to put an affirmative duty on prosecu-
tors to search out impeaching information regarding informer wit-
nesses. In United States v. Osorio,0 2 the Court held that a
"prosecutor charged with discovery obligations cannot avoid finding
out what 'the government' knows [about the witness] simply by de-
clining to make reasonable inquiry of those in a position to have rele-
vant knowledge. . . . The government, as represented by its
prosecutors in court, is under a duty of inquiry regarding information
concerning the criminal past of its cooperating witnesses. 10 3
The Osorio panel went out of its way to castigate the government
for what it called "sloppy practice" because of its tardy disclosure to
the defense of impeaching evidence. 0 4
Equally important in the Supreme Court's opinion in Kyles is the
Court's blessing of an attack by the defense on the caliber of the in-
vestigation conducted by the police as a way to defeat the legitimacy
of the prosecution's case.10 5 In particular, Justice Souter identifies the
failure of the police to investigate whether the informer Beanie was
the actual killer as fair game.106 This means that a prudent investiga-
tor or a prosecutor will investigate the informer's possible complicity
and duplicity in any situation where a potential defense might be (as
in Kyles) that "the informer did it." Not only is such an investigation
an excellent way to make sure that you have the right defendant, but
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. 929 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1991).
103. Id. at 761-62.
104. Id. at 760.
105. See Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1571.
106. Id. at 1570 n.14, 1572 n.15.
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it will save you when you do have the right defendant from the fate of
the prosecutors in Kyles.'0 7 Kyles, by the way, provides a textbook on
how not to put together a case. To say that the investigation shot itself
in the foot is charitable.
If, on discovery, you knowingly fail to turn over information to
which the defense is entitled, you will be in big trouble. Read United
States v. Kojayan'08 for an example of how awful that trouble can be.
Not only did the assistant U.S. attorney get into trouble in that case,
but his whole office was taken to task.
See United States v. Hickey'0 9 for a case which denied defense
access to the file of a witness in the Witness Security Program on the
ground that the witness was in danger. The court held that, under
such circumstances, a general outline of the deal with the witness was
all that the defendant was entitled to.
10
I. Trial tactics
(1) Motions in limine to limit cross examination and opening statement.
Although discovery is virtually limitless when it comes to factors
weighing on the credibility of a cooperating criminal, careful consider-
ation should be given to making a motion in limine to preclude the
defense from going into inflammatory areas on cross-examination that
are really a general attack on character rather than credibility.
The key to such a motion, of course, is Rule 403 of Federal Rules
of Evidence,"' which provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence.
Rule 403 has been interpreted on numerous occasions to limit
cross-examination of government witnesses."l2
107. See id. at 1571.
108. 8 F.3d 1315, 1325 (9th Cir. 1993) (vacating the defendant's conviction and remand-
ing on the issue of dismissing the indictment as a sanction for the government's failure to
disclose discovery and related misleading statements to the jury).
109. 767 F.2d 705, 706-10 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Hopkinson v. United
States, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985).
110. Id. at 710.
111. FED. R. EVID. 403.
112. See United States v. Bari, 750 F.2d 1169, 1178-79 (2d Cir.) (precluding cross-exam-
ination relating to the psychiatric history of a government witness), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1019 (1984); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 82-83 (2d Cir.) (allowing cross-examina-
tion on the involvement of a witness in a significant robbery but precluding cross-examina-
tion on the details), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); United States v. Singh, 628 F.2d 758,
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In this regard, it should be argued (when appropriate) that per-
mitting the defense to elicit extraneous and highly inflammatory infor-
mation flies in the face of Rule 403 and prejudices the government by
causing the jury to focus unduly on elements of the witness' character
not relevant to credibility.
This, however, is an area in which a prosecutor should tread with
care. The right to confront and cross-examine a witness is a guarantee
of constitutional dimensions, and a successful motion in limine in this
area may backfire on appeal unless it is carefully crafted so as not to
deprive the defendant of too much. United States v. Mayer 13 ought to
be read and digested when you are contemplating erecting a protec-
tive barrier around a testifying criminal. Mayer states in this regard
that:
cross-examination of a witness in matters pertinent to his credibility
ought to be given the largest possible scope .... This is especially
true where a prosecution witness has had prior dealings with the
prosecutor or other law enforcement officials, so that the possibility
exists that his testimony was motivated by a desire to please the
prosecution in exchange for the prosecutor's actions in having some
or all of the changes against the witness dropped ... securing immu-
nity against prosecution for the witness ... or attempting to assure
that the witness received lenient treatment in sentencing. 114
The Ninth Circuit agrees with the Fifth Circuit in Mayer. In
United States v. Brooke," 5 Judge Reinhardt said:
We have previously pointed out that" [w]hen the case against a
defendant turns on the credibility of a witness, the defendant has
broad crossexamination rights." United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361,
1364 (9th Cir. 1984). We cannot overemphasize the importance of
allowing full and fair cross-examination of government witnesses
whose testimony is important to the outcome of the case. Out of
necessity, the government frequently relies on witnesses who have
themselves engaged in criminal activity and whose record for truth-
fulness is far from exemplary.
These witnesses often have a major personal stake in their
credibility contest with the defendant. Full disclosure of all relevant
information concerning their past record and activities through
763-65 (2d Cir.) (limiting cross-examination based on privacy concerns), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1034 (1980); United States v. Rabinowitz, 578 F.2d 910, 912 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding
trial judge's refusal to permit cross-examination with respect to government witnesses'
prior act of sodomy and psychiatric treatment therefor); United States v. Glover, 588 F.2d
876, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1978) (precluding cross-examination on psychiatric history after in
camera review of psychiatric records); United States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168, 171 (2d Cir.)
(excluding cross-examination of homosexuality), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
113. 556 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1977).
114. Id. at 248-49 (citations omitted).
115. 4 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
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cross-examination and otherwise is indisputably in the interests of
justice. Ordinarily, such inquiries do not require the expenditure of
an inordinate amount of time, and courts should not be reluctant to
invest the minimal judicial resources necessary to ensure that the
jury receives as much relevant information as possible. Nor should
unwarranted fear of juror confusion present any impediment. Fed-
eral jurors, who are expected to follow the complex testimony and
even more intricate instructions that are presented in many of our
criminal cases, such as multiple conspiracy prosecutions, are un-
likely to be confounded by a defendant's inquiry into the bias and
credibility of a key government witness. In any retrial, the district
court should afford Brooke a full and fair opportunity to question
Kearney regarding any of his past activities that are probative as to
the credibility of his testimony or as to any bias that may underlie
it.l16
If such a motion is made, and if it is successful, it obviously has
ramifications with respect to opening statements and what counsel can
and cannot say.
(2) Voir Dire
Let the jury know, without making a "big thing" about it, that
you are going to call a witness that is getting something in return for
his testimony. Ask if the jurors will reject such a witness out of hand
or if they will fairly listen to what the witness has to say. Adopt early
an attitude that you are not very pleased to have to do this, but crimes
aren't all committed in heaven so all our witnesses aren't angels, etc.
Preempt the defense. If a judge is reluctant to ask these questions,
point out that such questions are no different from asking a prospec-
tive juror whether he or she will give undue credibility to a police
officer just because he is a police officer, etc.
(3) Opening Statement
Front matter-of-factly and briefly all the "bad stuff" including the
deal, but don't dwell on it. Follow up the bad stuff with references to
matters that corroborate what the witness says. This is sometimes
called the "doctrine of inoculation." But don't put all your eggs in the
accomplice's basket. The case stands on its own two feet. Refer as
matter-of-factly as possible to the witness. The objective here is to
control the manner in which the jury first hears of the dirt. If you do
not do this and instead turn over the opportunity to the defense to
"uncover the government's dirty laundry," you will be in deep tactical
trouble.
116. Id. at 1489.
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A trap lies waiting for you, however, unless you are careful. If
you under-inform the jurors about the extent of the witness' negative
baggage, a clever defense attorney might accuse you of hiding relevant
information, or "gilding the rotten lily." In the prosecution of Robert
Wallach, for example, the prosecution only briefly referred in its
opening statement to the fact that its principal witness was a multiple
felon. The defense countered by expanding in detail and revealing
that the witness had committed 113 felonies, all of which except one
had resulted in virtually no sentence because of his cooperation with
the prosecution. The jury was then asked: "Why did these facts not
come from the government? Why is the government not honest with
you about the facts?" To avoid this trap, be thorough and clinical in
your presentation.
(4) Jury Instructions
You must be familiar with the instructions that cover accomplices,
corroboration, perjurers, drug addicts, immunity, prior convictions,
the witness security program, etc. Always review them with care long
before jury selection. This will cause you to look for effective ways to
cope with the cautionary admonitions that always crop up when an
accomplice or an informer enters into a case. Figure out your jury
arguments as early as possible.
The following is excerpted from favorable jury instructions on the
credibility of accomplices given in the case of United States v. Fried-
man,117 a case successfully prosecuted in 1987 in Connecticut involv-
ing corrupt New York City politicians. One significant feature of the
instruction is that it advises the jury not to second-guess a prosecutor's
decision to make a deal with a witness. 118 It also advises the jury that
dislike for a witness is not a basis standing alone to disregard his
testimony." 9
INSTRUCTION
I now turn to the question of accomplices. Almost all of the
important witnesses in this case are accomplices of one sort or an-
other. An accomplice is a person who is guilty of and could be pros-
ecuted for any crime or crimes of which the defendants are accused.
The law lays down several rules which govern your treatment of
accomplice testimony. In the first place, it is no concern of yours or
of mine why the Government chose not to indict a certain person or
if it did indict him, why it determined to treat that with leniency.
117. 854 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1988).
118. Id. at 568 n.7.
119. Md
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The decision of what persons should be prosecuted and what pleas
of guilty should be accepted from persons who are indicted are mat-
ters which the Constitution and Statutes of the United States have
delegated to the Attorney General of the United States, who, in
turn, has delegated it to the United States Attorney and his counter-
parts in other judicial districts. It is an awesome responsibility, but
the Constitution and statutes do not give you or me any authority to
supervise its exercise.
Also, as I believe I told you when you were being selected, if
you once come to the conclusion that an accomplice witness has
given reliable testimony, you are required to act on it exactly as you
would act on any other testimony you found to be reliable, even
though you may thoroughly dislike the witness giving it to you.
However, the law imposes upon you stringent requirements as
to how to evaluate such testimony before concluding it to be relia-
ble. Obviously, it's much more pleasant to be a witness than a de-
fendant. The law requires that you scrupulously examine an
accomplice's motives in persuading the Government to accept him
as a witness rather than prosecuting him as a defendant. So, you
can be sure that he's neither made up a story to incriminate some-
one nor colored the facts of an otherwise true story to make some-
one appear to be more guilty than he actually is.
I'm going to discuss with you in some detail the testimony of
the Witness Lindenauer, not because I think his testimony is more
important than any other witness-that is a question wholly within
your province to determine-but simply because all attorneys in the
case spent so much time on this particular aspect of his testimony
that it lends itself to illustrating the principles involved.
In the first place, Lindenauer told you that he had lived a life
characterized by acts of wrongdoing, many of which involved decep-
tion. This is obviously a factor you will take into account in deter-
mining the reliability of his testimony.
In the second place, he was able to negotiate a plea which con-
siderably reduced the total scope of the sentence that might have
been imposed upon him had he been convicted of all his
wrongdoings.
And finally, he hopes, as he specifically told you, that the testi-
mony he gave in the case will induce the judge before whom he pled
guilty to be lenient in imposing sentence.
These circumstances could have affected Lindenauer in at least
three possible ways. They could have caused him to make up imagi-
nary facts in order to incriminate some or all of the defendants, or
they could have caused him to color existing facts to make them
appear to be more incriminating than they actually were. Or, on the
other hand, they might have caused him to conclude that his best
hopes of salvation was to be able to convince the judge who ulti-
mately sentences him that he was scrupulously honest in his testi-
mony before you. You should take account of these and any other
possibilities that might occur to you in evaluating his testimony.
The foregoing principles apply in varying degrees to all so-
called accomplice witnesses. Some face sentences and some testi-
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fled under grants of various types of immunity, which greatly re-
duced the possibility of their ever being prosecuted. They all, in one
way or another, could conceive it to be in their own best interest to
achieve and retain the good will of the Government.
Now, in this connection, what you're concerned with is the wit-
ness' perception of this situation. And much has been argued about
the risk he runs of perjury if he testified untruthfully. In that situa-
tion you must look at his perception of what would happen to him,
and it might well be argued that his perception is that the best way
of avoiding such things would be to curry favor with the only person
who can prosecute him for perjury; namely, the Government.
On the other hand, it may just as logically result in his thinking
that the best way to avoid it is to avoid the commission of perjury.
It's his perception that you focus on, what you think he thinks, how
you think that would influence his testimony.
Of course, that's not the only thing you consider. You consider
every element of credibility in dealing with the witness, how his tes-
timony fits in with other evidence in the case, and all the other
things that I mentioned to you.
120
(5) Direct Examination
Make it pointed, and at times make it sound to the jury like cross-
examination. You are not the champion of the witness. You are a
person charged with getting at the truth; and you aren't at all embar-
rassed by having to call a crook to do it. Bring out all the problems
such as every benefit being extended to the witness in consideration of
his testimony, previous inconsistent statements, etc., and confront the
witness with them. Don't wait for the defense. You must control the
manner in which the jury first hears of the dirt or the dirt will end up
on you. Go on the offensive. Section 607 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence allows you to do this.121 See also United States v.
Necoechea,1' - United States v. Winter,123 United States v. Hedman,124
and United States v. Craig,'25 for the proposition that this kind of an-
ticipatory material is appropriate on direct. The jury must rely on you
to get at the truth! If a witness lied to someone, you must bring that
out. Ask the witness whether he lied, and then tell him to explain why
he did that. Probe his attitude about testifying. Frequently it can be
120. Jury instructions on file with the author. A more redacted version of the instruc-
tions can be found in Friedman, 854 F.2d at 568 n.7.
121. Rule 607 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "The credibility of a witness
may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him."
122. 986 F.2d 1273, 1280 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993).
123. 663 F.2d 1120, 1133 (1st Cir. 1981), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983).
124. 630 F.2d 1184, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
125. 573 F.2d 513, 519 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub norm. Merkert v. United States, 439
U.S. 820 (1978).
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convincing-if it is candid. If there is a lot of negative information,
weave it in slowly rather than giving the jury too much to swallow in
one bite.
Your goal in this regard is to steal every bit of legitimate thunder
that the defense might be able to muster on cross. Vaccinate the jurors
by controlling the manner in which they are exposed to the problems.
If the jury has already heard it from you, it loses a lot of its sting. Put
in a different perspective, the best defense that you can provide for a
witness against vigorous cross-examination is to have revealed the
problems yourself to the jury during opening statement and then on
direct. If the jury first hears about such damaging and troublesome
matters from you, the defense is disarmed and you build your own
credibility. Under your skillful questioning, you can couch these mat-
ters in a sterile setting, minimize their dramatic impact, and cushion
them with an appropriate explanation. Examples of such material are
prior convictions, grants of immunity or leniency, deals, promises, re-
wards, perjury, mistakes, and inconsistencies. 126 In People v. Gordon,
the California Supreme Court even went so far as to sanction an ad-
monition by a prosecutor to a jury in opening statement that one of
his own witnesses might not be completely truthful. 127 The court
noted that "a party does not necessarily have a free choice of wit-
nesses but must take those who know the facts, and therefore cannot
vouch for them."'
2 8
As discussed above, cast yourself temporarily in the role of the
defense attorney and figure out how you would cross-examine your
own witness. Make a list of the areas you would attack, and then seek
ways to prevent the attack by neutralizing the area before the defense
attorney gets a chance.
If the witness is in the federal Witness Security Program and re-
ceiving subsistence payments, go into it on direct. Otherwise, on
cross-examination the defense will ask-"How much are you getting
for your testimony?"-and the answer may crush your case.129 Have
a game plan to handle every aspect of the program if it is attacked as a
126. See United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135, 137-38 (4th Cir. 1983) (allowing the
prosecutor to introduce evidence of its witness' plea agreement before it was attacked on
cross-examination); United States v. McNeill, 728 F.2d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 1984) (allowing the
prosecution to introduce the fact that its witnesses had been granted immunity).
127. 516 P.2d 298, 304-06 (Cal. 1973).
128. Id. at 304.
129. See United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1009-10 (9th Cir.) (providing an exam-
ple of a jury instruction about payments to witnesses), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 (1979).
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method of purchasing testimony. What will you say in final
argument?
If you anticipate a defense based on the argument that the in-
former/witness is really the perpetrator, after Kyles you probably have
the option of using direct to put on evidence in the form of "conscien-
tious police work,"' 30 that the police investigated this possibility and
concluded that it was not true. Or, you might want to wait until redi-
rect to wheel out these guns. The point here is that you must have a
cogent plan to meet this contingency before the trial starts.
If you like to write out verbatim the questions that you intend to
ask a witness with the answers that he has told you he will respond
with, be careful that you are not accused of perjuriously scripting the
witness' testimony. Whatever you do, do not give a copy of such a
document to the crook. If you do, it may come back to haunt you if
the crook decides to cross back to the underworld with the "script" in
his possession. Such a script was used (unsuccessfully) to accuse a
U.S. attorney in Oklahoma of manufacturing evidence.
(6) Corroboration
As I have already mentioned, when evaluating your evidence and
planning your case, always start from the proven rule of thumb that
the jury will not accept the word of a criminal unless it is corroborated
by other reliable evidence. The jurors will also pick and choose, ac-
cepting that part of a crook's testimony that is corroborated and re-
jecting that part that is not. I cannot stress this point too strongly. If
you are going to have to rely on the uncorroborated or even weakly
corroborated word of an accomplice or an informer, get back out in
the field and go back to work. Corroboration is to an accomplice's
testimony what gasoline is to a car: without it you get nowhere. The
best thing that can happen to you is that the leads provided to you by
the witness will uncover so much other good evidence that you won't
have to call him at trial Deciding not to use an accomplice, however,
can be a difficult judgment call, especially when his evidence is very
probative. On occasion, you may not have to make this decision until
late in a trial when you can get a better sense of how everything is
going than is possible before a trial starts. To retain the option of
calling him, simply do not refer to his identity during voir dire or your
opening statement. Simply say, "And we will prove that the defend-
ant personally made the decision to execute his rival" without- saying
130. Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1572 n.15 (1995).
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how you intend to do so. Then, if you decide at the end of your case-
in-chief that you need the accomplice's testimony, you can use it with-
out fear of claims of sandbagging-so long as you have completed
discovery and notified the court you are retaining this approach as an
option. Do not surprise the judge. Some might deny you this oppor-
tunity if you do.
At the risk of repeating myself, let me offer yet another example
of this important principle: the Walker/Whitworth espionage series of
cases. Because of glaring weaknesses in the Whitworth case, John
Walker himself was called as a witness against his accomplice. This
tactic was successful, but the jurors' observations as reported in the
Washington Post are very educational:131
Jurors expressed considerable sympathy for Whitworth and ex-
treme distaste for Walker, the chief witness against the former Navy
colleague he recruited into the spy ring.
In the first afternoon of deliberations, when they were finally
permitted to express their views about the long trial, jurors "vented
our individual feelings," [juror] Young said, and there was an out-
pouring of hostility against Walker.
"The man gives a new meaning to the word low," juror Minda
Amsbaugh, a bank officer, said.
Foreman Neumann called Walker "the most villainous person
I've ever seen," and added, "I personally would feel that it's not
just," if Walker were released from prison before Whitworth.
"John Walker was clearly a worm, clearly a despicable charac-
ter," Young said. "There was a feeling it was just too bad there
wasn't another person on trial," he added, referring to Walker.
"Walker seems to have gotten the better of this deal and Jerry's left
holding the bag."
But, he said, the jury believed that Walker was "essentially tell-
ing the truth" in his testimony about Whitworth's participation in
the ring.
Walker agreed to plead guilty to espionage and is to be sen-
tenced to life in prison in return for more lenient treatment for his
son, Navy Seaman Michael Lance Walker, who also pleaded guilty
and is to be sentenced to 25 years.
"We all had our favorite little lies that we thought we detected"
in Walker's testimony, Browne said, "but in the end it didn't make a
difference because there was enough corroborating testimony on all
the major issues." He said he thought payment schedules seized in
both men's homes were "especially damning," a factor also cited by
Neumann.
132
131. Ruth Marcus, "Israeli Defense" Rejected by Whitworth Spy Jury, WASH. Pos-r, July
26, 1986, at A6.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
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Physical evidence is the best. Corroborate everything you can.
Prove the guilt of the witness as well as the guilt of the defendant.
Corroboration is what the jurors want and what they look for-make
it visual. Prepare charts, blow up pictures, etc.
In choosing the order of witnesses, consider corroborating the
witness before you put him on the stand where it makes chronological
sense; for example, have the storekeeper identify him first as the by-
stander robber, then he can take the stand and identify his killer ac-
complice. You are allowed to prove the substantive guilt of your
witness to establish the truth of his claim to firsthand knowledge of
the crime in question. The fact of his guilty plea is also admissible, but
a limiting instruction is required.133 Such testimony, is tricky, and
should be handled with great care. The witness' plea is not admissible
directly to prove a defendant's guilt, only to reflect on the witness'
credibility, on his first-hand knowledge, or to dampen claims that the
witness has been given a free ride for his cooperation. 34 Whatever
you do, don't say, "And our turncoat witness George Bultaco will tell
you he has pleaded guilty to the very same crime for which the de-
fendant is on trial."
If he is going to testify about his arrest, put the arresting officer
on first to tell the jury what happened. If the jurors have already
heard it from someone else, it is easily accepted by them when the
same thing comes from him.
(7) Preparation of the Witness for Cross-Examination
Prepare the witness for cross-examination, but be careful not to
create a rehearsed witness who can be unmasked as such by the de-
fense. Your witness must be able to survive a vigorous cross-examina-
tion to have any substantial value in the eyes of the jurors.
The main thought to pound into the witness' head is that he must
not play games with the defense attorney or allow himself to get upset.
The only specific instructions I ever gave a witness was to remember
at all times that testifying is not designed to "get anyone" or to protect
himself, it is a time to tell the truth about everything no matter who
asks the questions-me, the defense attorney, or the judge. If a fool-
ish defense attorney ever asked such a witness what I told him to say
133. See United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a
guilty plea is admissible for the limited purpose of evaluating the witness' credibility).
134. See United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473,476 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, -115 S. Ct. 574
(1994), and United States v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 669, 675-78 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct.
344 (1994), for discussions of this issue.
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or do on the stand, he was told "Mr. Trott told me to answer all the
questions truthfully no matter who asks them, Mr. Trott, you (refer-
ring to the defense attorney), or the judge." Also, the witness should
not play to the jury by looking at them. Jurors do not like this.
(8) Final Argument
Accentuate the corroboration. Brush off the defense. Tell the
jury:
We know that. I told you all about that during my opening
statement and again during the direct examination! The issue in
this case isn't whether Terry Miller is a crook with a prior felony
conviction who lied to the police after he was arrested. The issue
for you to decide is whether he has told the truth under oath here in
court about his crime partner (point out the defendant) Alfred Ma-
son, the defendant. And with that in mind, let's talk about the evi-
dence that corroborates his testimony and proves independently
and conclusively that Alfred Mason murdered David Kernan.
One of my favorite tactics was to suggest to the jurors that they
set aside at the outset of their deliberation the testimony of the ac-
complice for the purpose of testing the case on the basis of the rest of
the evidence. The jury will do this anyway, and it enables you to ar-
gue that the case is "there" without his testimony. "Let's suppose that
Terry Miller (the accomplice witness), himself, was killed during the
shooting and never made it into this courtroom," I would tell them,
"and let's see what the rest of the evidence shows." Then I took a
Sherlock Holmes approach to "solving the case," and the jurors usu-
ally loved it. They want to be the detectives, not just the jurors. Invite
them to solve it with you. Dwell on the strength of the circumstantial
evidence. Then after I described an airtight case against the defend-
ant, I then told the jurors to add the accomplice's testimony to the mix
and the defendant's guilt is established not only beyond a reasonable
doubt, but to an absolute certainty. "Terry Miller's testimony is just
frosting on the cake; he is not the government's 'key witness,' as the
defense would have you believe."
In making this argument, you can fashion out of the corroborat-
ing and circumstantial evidence a web that points towards and snares
the defendant. If you work towards this argument from the beginning
of your case preparation, it will frequently fall easily into place. Its
purpose among other things is to give the jury a device to shift the
focus from your witness back to the defendant and to the incriminat-
ing and corroborating evidence. Do not buy into what the defense
attorney says the case is all about.
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One aspect of the witness that you can emphasize is his motive to
tell the truth. Point out that he can only have a motive to tell the truth
because that is what will get him what he wants. Lies will only destroy
the deal and cause him to be prosecuted for perjury:
He wants to stay out of jail. All he has to do to stay out is tell
the truth, not lie. Lies will put him right where he doesn't want to
be, in prison. His motive based on the evidence and the record can
only be to tell the truth!
To this you can add that "by stepping forward and telling you
what he knows, he has made himself publicly into an informer, a
snitch. Do you think that a person does that lightly? Of course not.
That is not something that a person would willingly do if it were just
make believe!"
During your rebuttal argument, be prepared if necessary to justify
and defend any deal that you have made, but do not vouch for the
witness! Read United States v. Smith135 to see what you cannot say to
a jury in this regard. Point out that crooks don't usually commit their
crimes on videotape and leave copies lying around for everyone to
review. Point out also that we can't go to central casting to get our
witnesses; we have to go to people who know something about the
crime and, unfortunately, some of those people are going to be the
crooks themselves. You didn't choose these witnesses; the defendant
did by recruiting them into his scheme. They aren't the government's
friends, they are his!
You are not at all happy about having had to make this deal, but
you are not apologizing for it either. "The integrity of the government
demands it. It is simply unacceptable to convict only the bagman and
let the crooked politician get off. If we never made deals with the
little fish, the smart big fish would always get away. Is that what you
want to happen?" Once again, get the spotlight off your witness and
onto the real crook.
This is also a good time to dust off the tried and true argument to
the effect that, when a defense attorney has the law on his side, he
talks about the law; when he has the facts, he talks about the facts;
but when he has neither, he attacks the prosecutor and the
government.
Be very careful how you use the plea agreement. Again, you may
not "vouch" for the witness. A number of cases in different circuits
135. 962 F.2d 923, 933-36 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the prosecutor wrongfully
vouched for his witness by telling the jury that the witness would not lie because he knew
that he would be subject to prosecution for perjury).
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have severely criticized prosecutors for misuse of the terms of a plea
agreement, referring to the polygraph, etc. For a comprehensive view
of the problems in this area, read United States v. Brown,136 United
States v. Kerr,1 37 United States v. Smith,138 and United States v.
Perez.1
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In 1883, over a century ago, Prosecutor William H. Wallace as-
sumed the task of prosecuting the infamous Frank James, brother of
Jesse, for murder. 140 To do so, Wallace called a member of the James
gang to the stand, one Dick Liddil.141 Liddil was a convicted horse
thief, an accused murderer, and a traitor to the band who was trying to
evade the punishment his crimes deserved. 142 As was to be antici-
pated, Liddil's credibility and character came under fierce attack by
the defense as did the State for "its misconduct" in making an unholy
deal with him. 143 Here is Wallace's reply to the jury. Although some
of it certainly would be inappropriate under today's standards, you
might find much of it useful:
Dick Liddil was a member of a band of train robbers, known as
the James gang. This nobody denies. If he had not been, he could
not have rendered the State the vast benefit that he has. When men
are about to commit a crime they do not sound a trumpet before
them. They do their work in secret and in darkness. Neither when
they are forming bands for plunder or death, do they select consci-
entious, honest citizens. A man contemplating murder would not
say, "come along, Mr. Gilbrath, or Mr. Nance [both jurors], and join
me in my fiendish task." Their work is done when honest, law-abid-
ing men are asleep, and "beasts creep forth." For this reason, when
the State would break up a band of criminals, it must depend upon
the assistance of one of their peers in crime to do it. Hence, it is a
custom, as old as the law, to pick out from a desperate band one of
136. 720 F.2d 1059, 1069-72 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the admission of a witness'
plea agreement with special attention paid to a clause in which the witness promised to
undergo polygraph testing was error).
137. 981 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding error where the prosecutor told the
jury that he had accepted a plea agreement from a witness because of his belief that it was
truthful).
138. 962 F.2d 923, 933-36 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding error where the prosecutor re-
sponded to defense attacks on a criminal witness' credibility through multiple statements
by the prosecutor claiming that he would only put on truthful evidence and that his wit-
nesses were therefore truthful).
139. 67 F.3d 1371, 1379 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding conviction where a prosecutor
merely responded to a defense attack on the plea agreements of witnesses after the defense
introduced the agreements into evidence).
140. See WILLIAM A. SE=rLE, JR., JESSE JAMES WAS His NAME 139 (1966).
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their own number, and use him as a guide to hunt the others down.
No honest, law-abiding man objects to this. When men go about
where this is done, crying "perfidy," "traitor," "treason," you can
put them down as the enemies of good government, or so steeped in
prejudice that they know not what they do. Liddil, the least de-
praved man in the most secret, desperate band perhaps the world
ever saw, has thus been used; and the State has chosen, also, to call
him as a witness in this case. Mountains of abuse have been heaped
upon him; the English language has been ransacked for terms of
vilification. Once, forsooth, and after he got to be a train-robber,
too, he was a splendid fellow; splendid enough to be the boon com-
panion of so pure and great a man as Frank James. You remember
that the defendant himself testified that Liddil, passing under an
alias, was his guest, ate at his table, and slept under his roof. Liddil
was one of the heroes then of whom we have heard so much. But
suddenly he makes a change. He leaves the shades of crime and
comes out into the sunlight of law and order; and all at once, strange
to say, he is transformed into a "viper," a "villain," a "scoundrel," a
"demon," or such "execrable shape," as his old tutor's counsel can
give him. But let the attorneys for the defense go on with their
abuse; it is part of their business. I shall not retort by calling the
defendant a "viper," a "perjurer," a "demon," and the like....
It is said that Dick Liddil surrendered, and bargained with the
Governor of the State, and [Police Commissioner] Craig and [Sher-
iff] Timberlake to convict Frank James, guilty or innocent, in order
to obtain immunity for himself. I deny that. There is no proof
about it, and I have a right, in answer, to emphatically and positively
deny it. The only contract with Liddil was that always made with
those turning State's evidence, as we call it, namely, that he should
tell the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; and if he told a false-
hood he did it at his peril, and the contract was ended.144
I'm sorry to report the tag to this story: Frank James was acquit-
ted.145 Why? Because the only evidence tying him to the murder
came from Dick Liddil.146 So there's nothing new to my claim that an
absence of corroboration will be fatal to your case.
Finally, and I repeat, never at any time lose control of the wit-
ness. He will try to manipulate you if he can, thinking that you need
him, not vice versa. Be prepared to say "no" to outlandish requests
and let him know at all times that you are in charge. This can be done
very politely, and believe it or not, he will usually respect you for it.
He must trust you to a certain degree, but it doesn't hurt to have an
element of fear built into the trust and respect. You do not want to let
144. William H. Wallace, Prosecutor, Closing Argument in State v. James, (Sept. 1883)
Daviess County Circuit Court Records, Criminal Files No.27 and No. 44, Gallatin, Missouri
(on file with the author).
145. See SErLn, supra note 140, at 140.
146. Id.
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him think he can cross you and get away with it. If he commits per-
jury, prosecute him for it. That's your duty. The truth is your stock in
trade!
Conclusion
Unfortunately, using informers is both central and extremely per-
ilous to many prosecutions. As you decide how or whether to use
them, remember what effect their background and their inherent con-
flicts will have on average jurors. However, jurors will understand the
need for snitches, co-conspirators, and informers and will not attach
their disgust with them to your case if you are careful in your ap-
proach. Stay mindful of the welter of ethical, constitutional, and stra-
tegic issues that surround the use of such witnesses, and you will keep
your head above water and be able to successfully prosecute criminals
who might otherwise escape punishment.
